10—
9116 5

MAO TSE-TUNG

O. Vladimirov
and
V. Ryazantsev

A POLITICAL PORTRAIT

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian by *Leonard Stoklitsky*

Designed by *Anatoly Suima*

О. Е. Владимиров,
В. И. Рязанцев

СТРАНИЦЫ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ БИОГРАФИИ МАО ЦЗЭ-ДУНА

На английском языке

First printing 1976

© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1976

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

В $\frac{10302\text{-}398}{014(01)\text{-}76}$ 54-76

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 5

THE RISE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA and THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO LINES IN IT . . . 22

MAO TSE-TUNG'S EMERGENCE AS A POLITICAL LEADER 40

MAO TSE-TUNG'S STRUGGLE FOR UNDIVIDED CONTROL OVER THE ARMY AND THE PARTY 52

HOW THE MAOISTS FOUGHT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS-INTERNATIONALISTS 65

MAOIST NATIONALISM AND ANTI-SOVIETISM BEFORE THE VICTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION . . . 82

MAOIST ATTEMPTS TO MAKE A DEAL WITH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 95

THE MAOIST POLICY ON CADRES 116

CONCLUSION 129

Introduction

In recent years the Maoists have been waging a furious ideological and political struggle against Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, against the general line of the Communist and Workers' parties, against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. What a few years ago still appeared to be a theoretical discussion, a debate on the interpretation of separate propositions of Marxism-Leninism has turned into a virulent campaign by the Peking leadership against the Marxist-Leninist parties, against the Marxist-Leninist teaching, against the Communist Party of China and the socialist gains of the working people of the People's Republic of China. The overwhelming majority of the participants in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969 strongly criticised the anti-Marxist conceptions and anti-socialist activity of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China.

When the open polemics imposed on the communist movement by the Maoists was still at its height the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exposed the substance of the Chinese leadership's political line, a course that is a combination of petty-bourgeois adventurism and great-power chauvinism. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU held in February 1964

declared that Leninism had on more than one occasion come across the kind of views and guidelines put forward by the Maoists. They are rooted in petty-bourgeois revolutionism that smacks of anarchism, in an inability to counteract the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element and in frankly nationalistic aspirations. At its Plenary Meeting in December 1966 the Central Committee of the CPSU stated that the anti-Leninist views and the great-power, nationalistic course of the present Chinese leadership had to be thoroughly exposed.

Speaking about the possible outcome of the proletariat's struggle against the anarchistic tendencies that stem from the petty proprietor, Lenin emphasised:

"Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will overthrow our workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands."[1]

The situation in the People's Republic of China has been developing in the direction of the worser of the variations foreseen by Lenin. In the course of the "cultural revolution" which flared up from 1966 onwards the political system of the People's Republic of China as a state guided by the working class underwent significant deformation. The

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 332.

organs of popular government ceased to function. The Communist Party of China itself was paralysed from top to bottom as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. The trade unions, the Young Communist League and other public organisations, including even the Young Pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of the country's public, political, economic and cultural life came under the control of the army. As a result, what Lenin called "*a shift of power*" took place: the working class was pushed aside from the real levers of power, and its political party ceased to hold the ruling position. *A military-bureaucratic dictatorship arose in China.* The proletarian ideology—Marxism-Leninism—was, in effect, ousted from its guiding role in society and replaced by "the thought of Mao".

To speed up and legalise this "shift of power" the Maoists broke away from the ideological and organisational foundations which the Communist Party of China had formulated at its Eighth Congress in 1956. They did this at the Ninth Congress, convened in April 1969. The Ninth Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the army; army men stood at the head of the "revolutionary committees" which in the process of the "cultural revolution" had replaced the elected local governing bodies. The Congress put forward a programme of preparations for war and endorsed Mao's course of militarising the country. The CPC Rules adopted at the Congress proclaimed "the thought of Mao Tse-tung" to be the Marxism-Leninism of the contemporary era. Although the term "democratic centralism" crops up fairly often in the

official press, actually the whole of Maoist activity is aimed at doing away with inner-Party democracy, at implanting a barracks regime in the Party. In substance, the Rules laid down a line of *building, under the name of the CPC, a new political organisation* destined to serve as an instrument of, and a screen for, a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The Tenth CPC Congress, convened in August 1973, stated that "the revolutionary practice since the time of the Ninth Congress ... confirms the correctness of both the political and organisational line of the Ninth Congress, the correctness of the leadership of the CC CPC headed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung", and that "our Party and government are firmly and consistently putting into practice in the international arena the foreign policy drafted by the Ninth Congress". Also, it set the task of "consolidating and multiplying the gains of the great proletarian cultural revolution" and claimed that "Mao Tse-tung has worked out our Party's main line and policy for the entire historical stage of socialism".

Notwithstanding its "Marxist phraseology" and social camouflage the Mao Tse-tung group is obviously pursuing an *anti-popular* course. The policy it set forth at the Ninth and Tenth CPC congresses runs counter to the interests of all of China's working people. To the *peasants*, more than 80 per cent of the population, the Maoist policy means conservation of an extremely low living standard, with the elimination of prospects of improving their material and cultural standards. The Maoists deprive the *working class* of

the possibility of influencing developments in the country, to say nothing of guiding them. The Maoists are turning the *intelligentsia*, whom they subjected to particularly brutal physical reprisals and mental humiliation during the "cultural revolution", into a target of incessant attacks.

The Maoists have dealt a powerful blow to *the alliance of the working class and the peasantry*, an alliance which is the very foundation of the system of people's democracy. Even before the "cultural revolution" the socio-economic basis of this alliance had been undermined by the policy of the "great leap forward" and the people's communes. The People's Assemblies, a democratically elected body that was the main political institution of the alliance, has been paralysed for a long time. But the Maoists did not infringe on the interests of the *national bourgeoisie*.

For many years now the Maoists have been carrying out an *anti-Leninist nationalities policy*. They are stepping up the forcible assimilation of national minorities. The position and living standards of the national minorities continue to deteriorate steadily. Cultural and artistic personalities of the national minorities are persecuted. Many Party and government functionaries belonging to a non-Han nationality have been removed from their posts and proclaimed "enemies". The last remnants of the local autonomy which the Constitution of 1954 guaranteed the non-Chinese peoples are being wiped out.

The Maoists are undermining the work of building the economic foundations of socialism in China. The "great leap forward" of 1958 and the

"cultural revolution" took an enormous toll of material resources and destroyed the socialist economic management agencies.

The specific domestic and foreign policy course which the petty-bourgeois nationalistic section of the CPC leadership imposed on the country caused grave economic difficulties. The gross national product dropped by over 30 per cent, including the 50 per cent decline in industrial output; the national income decreased by more than 25 per cent. All this had a disastrous effect on the situation of the masses.

The realities of life forced the Maoists to introduce changes in their domestic policy although they did not, officially, abandon the slogan of "three red banners"—the new "general line", the "great leap forward" and the people's communes. At the cost of extreme efforts by the people and thanks to the return, in a certain degree, to socialist forms of economic management the People's Republic of China succeeded, by the end of 1964, in regaining the 1957 level of industrial and agricultural output. In the intervening seven years, however, the population had grown. Moreover, in 1964, China detonated its first atomic bomb and, disregarding its limited resources, joined in the nuclear-missile weapons race. The energetic propaganda and subversive activities which Peking launched against the world communist movement in 1960, and its great-power foreign policy also swallowed up tremendous funds. The rupture, by the petty-bourgeois nationalists, of co-operation with the socialist countries caused China irreparable damage.

The "cultural revolution" dealt the Chinese economy another heavy blow. By the middle of 1967 China's industrial output was about 20 per cent less than it had been the previous year. Recovery did not begin until 1968. Only in 1969 did China manage to reach, in absolute figures, the economic level it maintained on the eve of the "cultural revolution" and then begin to make some advances.

Having, in effect, put a brake on the industrialisation programme, the Maoists are intensively *militarising* the economy striving for maximum growth rates in industries connected with the country's nuclear-missile potential. Their investments for construction in the atomic and missile industries are several times greater than in the civilian industries. This policy is causing disproportions in the economy. The solution of vitally important economic problems connected, above all, with improving the living standards and raising the people's cultural level is continuously being postponed to a later date.

The Tenth Congress of the CPC in August 1973 endorsed the general guidelines of China's development as had been laid down earlier by Mao Tse-tung: to "steadily continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", "as before, wage a thorough struggle, criticism and transformation in the sphere of the superstructure", "devote much attention to the class struggle", and "in all earnestness put into practice the proletarian political guidelines elaborated by Chairman Mao Tse-tung". Chou En-lai enumerated these guidelines in the report he delivered "in the name

of the CC CPC". Mao Tse-tung had put them forward mainly in the late fifties and early sixties to counteract the decisions of the Eighth CPC Congress and serve as a foundation for the "great leap forward", the shift away from industrialisation and other steps marking the Chinese leadership's retreat from the general principles of building socialism. These guidelines were supplemented by instructions handed down by Mao Tse-tung during the "cultural revolution" "to prepare for war and prepare for hunger" by "digging deep tunnels and building up stocks of grain everywhere". The Tenth Congress branded as China's enemies those who "opposed continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, regarding an expansion of production ... as the main task". The report called the latter view "a re-edition of the absurd revisionist theory which Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta had managed to include in the resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Party". "Criticism of the reactionary theory of productive forces" was prominent in the campaign propagandising the documents of the Tenth Congress.

The return to Mao Tse-tung's bankrupt guidelines and the opposition of the Maoist "revolution" to the tasks of expanding production, shows that the Tenth CPC Congress went still farther along the Maoist road, orienting the country towards a continuation of "the revolution" in its Maoist interpretation instead of towards peaceful economic development, towards building the material and technical basis of a socialist society. It was by no means accidental that the main report delivered by

Chou En-lai opened by citing a statement made by Mao Tse-tung at the previous Party Congress to the effect that "we may have to carry out another revolution a few years from now". A keynote of the main report and of Wang Hung-venh's report on changes in the Party Rules, and of the "Information Communiqué" of the Congress was Mao Tse-tung's guideline concerning the perpetual nature of the "class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat". The reports and the communiqué emphasised that "a battle between the two lines inside the Party ... will continue for a long time. It will break out ten, twenty and thirty times". This guideline aggravates the contradiction between Maoism and the real needs of Chinese society; it is a contradiction which lies at the bottom of the periodic crises that doom China to new upheavals and greater difficulties.

Mao Tse-tung's economic policy has led to a serious *deformation of the socialist relations of production* whose foundation was laid during China's first five-year plan (1953 to 1957). The changes in the political superstructure that was built up after the people's revolution and the gross violations of the economic laws and principles of socialist economic management are emasculating the socialist elements in China's socio-economic system. The fact that public ownership has been preserved in the People's Republic of China does not refute the above conclusion. Marx and Engels noted that public ownership only provides the possibility for resolving[1] social contradictions, that

[1] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1975, p. 331.

under various social conditions the conversion of property into state property can produce different results and have different social consequences. It is the social nature of the state that plays the decisive role in this.

The operation of the basic economic laws of socialism has been disrupted in China. Lenin emphasised that the aim of socialist society is to assure "*full* well-being and free, *all-round* development for *all* the members of society".[1] In contrast, Mao and his entourage are subordinating the development of social production to their hegemonic plans. The greater share of the national income is being spent to carry out these plans, to prepare for war and to conduct subversive activity against the socialist countries and the communist movement. The Maoists combat the working people's legitimate economic demands by political manoeuvres and direct repression. They are replacing balanced, proportionate economic development by voluntaristic "leaps forward"; instead of distributing material benefits according to the amount of work performed they carry out a levelling policy; instead of providing material incentives they employ non-economic coercive methods. The Maoists have deprived the working people of the possibility of taking part in managing the national economy. A gap has appeared between the interests of the state (the military-bureaucratic dictatorship) and the interests of the working people.

In pursuit of their hegemonic objectives *in in-*

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 54.

ternational affairs the Maoists are steadily intensifying their subversive and divisive activity against the socialist community, the world communist movement and other revolutionary forces. Despite periodic shifts in tactics their main efforts are aimed at building up, under the aegis of Peking, an unprincipled alliance of heterogeneous political elements who are united by hostility to the Marxist-Leninist parties, by common anti-socialist actions, by opposition to the communist ideology.

The Peking leaders combine their struggle for hegemony in the world communist movement with great-power aspirations. The main task they have set China is expressed in the slogan: "Prepare for war". They are brainwashing the Chinese people and are whipping up out-and-out chauvinism and extreme fanaticism. Carrying out an anti-Marxist hegemonic course, they are attempting to poison and warp the minds of the majority of the Chinese with racist ideas.

Proclaiming *an ideological-political platform* of their own on the basic international issues and the world communist movement, *a platform which is incompatible with Leninism*, the Peking leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reject the course taken at its 20th Party Congress and also its Programme. They launched an intensive anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. Not only did they announce territorial claims against the Soviet Union but in the spring and summer of 1969 they provoked armed clashes on the Chinese-Soviet border.

Together with the other fraternal parties the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union has firmly opposed the Maoist attempts to distort Marxism-Leninism and to divide the socialist community, the international communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. At the same time, displaying restraint in the face of the acts of provocation, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government have done everything in their power to improve relations with China. Thanks to the Soviet Union's initiative some signs of a normalisation in Soviet-Chinese relations have appeared since the autumn of 1969. However, the Chinese leadership has continued its anti-Soviet line in propaganda and politics; moreover, the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth CPC congresses consolidated the anti-Marxist course hostile towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The fundamental changes that have taken place in the political superstructure and domestic and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China show that the Maoists are *leading the country away from the socialist road.*

* * *

In his speech on June 7, 1969, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said:

"It is a big and serious task to make an all-round Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of the events in China over the last few years, and of the roots of the present line of the CPC

leaders, which is jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese people".[1]

The question arises: how can one explain the violent attacks by Mao Tse-tung and his clique against the Marxist-Leninist party and the gains of socialism in their own country, how can one explain their course of intensive ideological and political struggle against the communist parties and the socialist countries, their course of rupturing relations with the international proletariat, their course of opposing themselves to the entire world revolutionary movement? How could it happen that nationalistic, anti-Marxist trends gained the upper hand in the Chinese leadership and are shaping the country's political situation? After all, the Communist Party of China has significant revolutionary services to its credit; it headed the heroic revolution carried out by the great Chinese people, a people who travelled a long, difficult and sanguinary road of struggle for liberation.

An examination of the facts and the documents shows that the *adventuristic and nationalistic policy of the present leadership of the CPC has its roots in history.* An unceasing struggle between two main lines can be traced in the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement, between the truly Marxist, internationalist course, on the one hand, and a nationalistic, petty-bourgeois course, on the other hand. For a long time the latter disguised itself as Marxism. Then it emerged as so-

---

[1] *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow 1969*, Prague, 1969, p. 157.

called "Sinicised Marxism", and lately it has been rabid, great-power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adventurism disguised by Leftist phraseology.

Unfortunately, it so turned out that this second course, closely linked up with the name of Mao Tse-tung, has predominated in China as a result of the use of violence and unbridled demagogy. The disastrous consequences of the Maoist policy is a striking example of what voluntaristic methods of leadership and the personality cult, which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, can lead to if they are not given a proper rebuff. The tragedy of the Chinese people and of the Chinese Communists shows what a danger the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic course represents to the revolutionary movement. This is a bitter lesson, a grim warning to all contingents of the world communist movement.

In order to build socialism there must be the material prerequisites—well-developed industries —and the social prerequisites—an industrial proletariat. A country in which these prerequisites are still only taking shape can also build socialism, but it vitally needs all-round political, material and scientific-technical assistance from the world socialist system, it must use the latter's experience, and it must also get support from the world working-class movement. The example of China has reaffirmed the relevancy of Lenin's instructions that the task of the Communist Party in an economically underdeveloped and formerly oppressed country is not only to do its utmost to enlarge the working class and promote its political education but also to further the contacts of the

working class and all working people of its own country with the working class of the world, and "to join the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle".[1]

* * *

As far back as the twenties, thirties and forties the international communist movement was alarmed about some of the things that were taking place in the Communist Party of China, particularly after Mao Tse-tung came to its leadership. These things also disturbed many Chinese Communists, which found expression in documents of that period that later were deliberately concealed by Mao Tse-tung and his group.

The fraternal parties sincerely strove to help the Chinese Communists to rid themselves of their mistaken views and opportunist deviations; they expressed their ideas in a friendly spirit in decisions and letters by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern), and also within the framework of inter-Party contacts. The fraternal parties believed that with the help of the international communist movement the leadership of the CPC would be able gradually to overcome its mistakes and take the correct road.

China's internationalist-minded Communists always highly appreciated the friendly stand of the Communist International and its all-round assistance to the CPC. The rise of the first Marxist study circles in China and the foundation of the Communist Party there in 1921 were linked up

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 162.

with the inspiring influence of the world communist movement. Chinese comrades acknowledge that the fundamental propositions on aspects of the revolutionary struggle in China, on the tactics and strategy of the Chinese revolution, that were put forward in Comintern and CPSU documents were of inestimable significance for the Communist Party of China. These propositions concerned the motive forces of the Chinese revolution, its specific features and its main tasks at various stages, and drew the conclusion that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China could grow over into a socialist revolution. They contributed significantly to working out the theoretical aspects of such major problems, among others, as the building up of the Party, the hegemony of the working class in Chinese conditions, the role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution, the establishment of revolutionary bases in the rural localities, and the development of the Chinese Red Army.

In 1935 the Seventh Congress of the Comintern put forward the idea of an anti-imperialist united front, emphasising, in connection with the growing imperialist expansion, the special importance of a united front for the colonies and dependencies. In keeping with this line the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang formed a united front in the war of resistance to the Japanese militarists (1937-1945). This united front became the centre rallying all the forces of the Chinese people to fight the foreign enslavers. The united front policy helped to turn the Communist Party of China into a mass-scale party that became the vanguard of

the Chinese people, and a countrywide political force.

The leaders of the CPC emphasised that the assistance given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the fraternal parties of other countries in working out the theoretical approach to problems of the Chinese revolution was an important form of support of the revolutionary movement in China. In 1949 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher, and we must learn from it."

This reminder is necessary because in recent years Peking has often misrepresented the history of the relations between the world communist movement and the Communist Party of China. Distorting the truth, apologists of Mao's personality cult, claim that it was he who elaborated all the main points of the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution. They allege that the Comintern and Moscow merely "prevented them from working out a correct line". This gross falsification is to be explained not only by political fawning. The Peking "theoreticians" have set out to rewrite the entire history of the Chinese revolution and CPC in a nationalist spirit.

Books on history published in Peking ignore international and domestic factors that ensured the victory of the Chinese revolution; they belittle the part played by the world communist movement. At the same time, they deliberately present a distorted picture of the struggle between the nationalist and internationalist trends in the CPC, varnish the political physiognomy of the present Chinese leaders, and whitewash the methods of

inner-Party struggle which the latter employed. These books shamelessly exaggerate the part Mao Tse-tung played in various stages of the Chinese revolution and gloss over all facts and evidence that expose the petty-bourgeois nationalists who now hold the leading posts in the CPC.

Doing everything they can to support the Mao Tse-tung cult, Mao's troubadours attempt to expurgate many pages from the history of the CPC and the history of the Chinese revolution; they attempt to erase from the people's memory a whole galaxy of splendid Chinese revolutionaries, men and women who helped to found the Communist Party of China, who upheld proletarian internationalism, unity with the other Marxist-Leninist parties and friendship with the Soviet Union.

The presentation of a truthful picture of the events and of the role which today's CPC leaders played in them is in the interests of the Chinese Communists themselves. This is essential, above all, in the struggle to expose the anti-Marxist, anti-popular policy of Mao and his supporters.

The aim of this pamphlet is to acquaint the reader with some little-known facts from the history of the inner-Party struggle in the CPC. Special attention is devoted to Mao Tse-tung's political activity.

The Rise of the Communist Party of China and the Struggle Between Two Lines in It

The conditions under which the Communist Party of China was founded and the views of China's Communists took shape were exception-

ally complicated. China at that time was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country, extremely backward in the economic, social, political and cultural respects.

Although the capitalist mode of production and commodity-money relations, development of which began at the end of the 19th century, had speeded up the disintegration of feudalism in China, agriculture, with numerous survivals of feudalism, remained the main branch of the economy. In 1949 modern industry accounted for only 17 per cent of the gross national output, the bulk of it coming from agriculture (nearly 70 per cent), manufactories and handicrafts.

The social structure was underdeveloped, matching the backward economy. At the time the People's Republic of China was established in 1949 there were only 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 industrial workers in the country. Petty-bourgeois elements predominated in the urban population. Peasants accounted for not less than 90 per cent of the Chinese population of 475,000,000. The bourgeoisie was a weak class divided into two groups—the compradore bourgeoisie, mainly big bourgeoisie, which had arisen through co-operation with foreign imperialists, and the national bourgeoisie, including chiefly the middle bourgeoisie and the more well-to-do segments of the petty bourgeoisie.

Various patriarchal, feudal, petty-bourgeois and bourgeois outlooks, anarchistic and Utopian socialist views and, finally, religious faiths (Buddhism, Confucianism) were intertwined in Chinese society. Unbridled great-Han nationalism had put down deep roots.

The Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 in Russia, which ushered in the era of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide scale, had a tremendous impact on China. It opened up before the Chinese people the road to liberation; it marked the beginning of the dissemination of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, of the ideas of scientific socialism in China. With diversified assistance from the Comintern, Marxist study circles were set up in the country. They were the foundation on which the Communist Party of China was established in July 1921.

The progress from study circles to the founding of the Communist Party took place relatively quickly, thanks to the existence of various revolutionary-democratic organisations, in which Marxist groups arose. Besides Communists, however, the organisations included adherents of anarchism, peasant socialism, and so on. It was this heterogeneity that later led to the ideological instability of some groups of Chinese revolutionaries.

China's specific socio-economic and political features influenced Marxist thought and the political views of some CPC leaders. They caused big difficulties for the revolutionary movement, difficulties that were largely connected, in particular, with *the weakness of the proletarian segment.* The young Chinese proletariat, which had not gone through a long school of class struggle, was a small islet in the vast petty-bourgeois ocean. Actually, China's working-class movement was only beginning to develop; it lacked experience. In social nature many Chinese Communists were typ-

ical petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, with all their inherent shortcomings and vacillations. "In the situation existing in China the working class is far from being a major factor capable of leading the entire national movement against imperialism," G. Voitinsky, representative of the Comintern in China wrote in October 1923.

The circumstance that *Marxism was totally unknown in China before the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia* also had a negative effect on the formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. It was the gun salvoes of the October Revolution, as Mao Tse-tung put it, that carried Marxism-Leninism to China.

Dwelling on the history of the rise of the proletarian party in Russia, Lenin said in his *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder:* "Russia achieved Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the *agony* she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience. . . . Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed."[1]

The Chinese revolutionaries did not have this kind of experience. Many Communists, particularly among the intelligentsia, regarded China's

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 25-26.

national emancipation, and not its social liberation, as their main objective. Nationalist ideas therefore prevailed in their thinking, pushing the ideas of the class struggle into the background. They saw the Marxist-Leninist teaching and the October Revolution primarily as a key "to national revival" and the "salvation of China", as Mao Tse-tung himself wrote.

The weakness of the proletariat plus the intertwining of the aims of the socialist, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolutions in a single revolutionary stream, and the involved ideological situation, all greatly influenced the formation of Marxist thinking in China and the political views of some of the leaders of the Communist Party of China. Not infrequently men who called themselves Marxists and proletarian revolutionaries, and who indeed were prepared to fight selflessly for the liberation of their country but who, in substance, had only a very remote connection with Marxism and the working-class movement, came into the Communist Party of China and into its leadership. This also explains why the CPC leaders who in the main followed a correct internationalist course and fought heroically for the cause of the working class, stumbled and made mistakes.

A Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC in November 1927 passed a resolution entitled "Immediate Organisational Tasks of the Communist Party of China" which noted: "One of the main organisational shortcomings of the CPC, a shortcoming of enormous *political* significance, is the circumstance that nearly the whole of the *leading active of our Party* consists *not of workers* and not even of

poorest peasants but of members of the *petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.* The CPC began to take shape as a political trend and as a party at a time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet emerged as a class and when the class movement of the workers and peasants was still in embryo. The upsurge of the *national liberation* movement, in which the bourgeoisie, and, especially, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, played a tremendous role by far outstripped, in China, the growth of the class-consciousness and class struggle of the exploited masses. In this period the most radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined our Party, which stood farthest to the Left wing in the national liberation movement. It was these elements that constituted the original core of the Communist Party of China. A massive influx of workers and poorest peasants into the Party began relatively late, together with the development of the working people's revolutionary class movement. Because of this, people from the *petty-bourgeois strata* preserved their leading role in the CPC. These revolutionary petty-bourgeois elements, who had been lifted up on the crest of the revolutionary wave and the enthusiasm of the initial period, had not gone through a theoretical schooling in Marxism and Leninism, did not know the experience of the international proletarian movement, were not connected with the exploited depths of the Chinese people and stood aside from the class struggle of the workers and peasants. A considerable part of them were not assimilated in the CPC, and did not turn into consistent proletarian revolutionaries. What is more, they brought

into the CPC all the political instability, inconsistency and lack of determination, inability to *organise*, and non-proletarian habits, traditions, prejudices and illusions that are to be found only in a petty-bourgeois revolutionary".

Nevertheless, the rise of the Communist Party was a *logical* and *necessary* outcome of the revolutionary movement which was developing in China as a result of the powerful impact of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. The victory of the workers and peasants in Russia called into life the revolutionary activity of the proletariat and of broad masses of the working people throughout the world, including the colonial and dependent countries.

The Movement of May 4 (1919), which arose under the influence of the October Revolution, convincingly showed that the working people of China were prepared to wage a resolute fight against imperialist oppression. Life insistently demanded that the Marxist study circles be transformed into a united political organisation capable of guiding the struggle of the young working class and the democratic and national liberation forces against social oppression, against imperialism. An organisation of this kind arose.

The Communist Party of China was born as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. At its *First Congress* it proclaimed its ultimate goals to be a socialist revolution, a dictatorship of the proletariat and a classless communist society. The First Congress of the CPC adopted a principled decision on affiliation with the Comintern. Despite the numerous difficulties, a sturdy Marxist core which

set a correct political course took shape in the communist movement in China at that time with the help of the Comintern.

The Second Congress, in July 1922, resolutely confirmed the striving of the CPC to become a genuinely proletarian party. "We must become a real political party created by the proletarian masses, permeated with a revolutionary spirit, ready to fight for the interests of the proletariat and to be a leader of the proletarian revolutionary movement," declared the Resolution on the Rules of the CPC.

The Congress expressed itself in favour of building a party on the Bolshevik model and passed a resolution on joining the Comintern, under the leadership of which the political and organisational work of the Chinese Communists proceeded in the years that followed.

The documents of *the Second, Third* (June 1923) and *Fourth* (January 1925) *congresses* regarded the proletariat as the Party's main bulwark and vanguard, and also, later, as the hegemon of the revolution, and the peasantry as the proletariat's main ally, without whose active support the Chinese revolution could not be victorious. By the time of *the Fifth Congress* (April-May 1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more than 50 per cent of whom were industrial workers and about 19 per cent peasants.

The Sixth Congress, which took place in June-July 1928 with the direct participation of a delegation from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) was an important landmark in the history of the Communist Party of China.

Several months before the Congress, in February of that year, the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the ECCI adopted a "Resolution on the Chinese Question" in which it described the current stage and specific features of the revolutionary movement in China, and emphasised that "the ECCI makes it a duty of all its sections to give maximum support to the Chinese revolution".

Under the influence of this resolution the Congress drafted documents that set forth what was in effect the first full-scale programme of the CPC. The Congress defined the following main tasks of the Chinese revolution: to expel the imperialists; to unite the country; to put an end completely to the ownership of land by big proprietors and free the peasants from all feudal bonds; to establish the power of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies as the best form of a democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry. On a recommendation from the ECCI delegation the Congress paid special attention to developing the peasant movement and partisan warfare under the slogans of the agrarian revolution, with the prospect of building up a regular workers' and peasants' Red Army on the basis of the partisan detachments.

All this indicated a genuine Marxist approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution, an approach which the internationalist-minded Communists upheld. First mention among the latter should go to Professor Li Ta-chao, one of the first propagandists of Marxism in China, and a founder of the Communist Party; Chu Chiu-po, a prominent Party leader who came to Russia and made

a first-hand study of the experience of the October Revolution; Peng Pai, organiser of the first peasant union and of the first workers' and peasants' government in China, formed in the southern part of the country; Chang Tai-lei, one of organisers of the Communist Party and Young Communist League, who headed the uprising in Canton (Kwangchow) in 1927; Su Chao-cheng, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Government of the Canton Commune; Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary centres, a participant in the Nanchang uprising, during which the Chinese Red Army was founded; Chu Teh, the legendary army leader; the Communist army leaders Yeh Ting, Peng Teh-huai and Ho Lung; Kao-Kang, one of the most prominent leaders of the revolutionary movement, the CPC and the People's Republic of China; Wang Ming, Po Ku, Chang Wen-tien and others who were members of the Party leadership at various times and upheld Marxist-Leninist, internationalist views in it. Many of them perished in the revolutionary battles and some were pushed out of the CPC leadership, but the glorious memory of their life and work lives on.

At various stages of the Chinese revolution Liu Po-cheng, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Li Fu-chun, Chou En-lai, Chen Yi, Yen Chien-ying, Chien Yun and other leaders also played a definite role in Party and military work.

Two lines, one Marxist and internationalist, whose banner was the ideas of the October Revolution, and the other, whose ideas in substance,

were nationalistic and petty-bourgeois, took shape more and more distinctly in the Communist Party of China. The latter line, linked chiefly with the name of Mao Tse-tung, subsequently became the petty-bourgeois, nationalist trend known as Maoism.

A battle between the Marxist, internationalist line and the petty-bourgeois, nationalist trend was and remains *a characteristic feature of the history of the Communist Party of China.* It was reflected in the decisions of Party congresses, in the theoretical concepts and guidelines of the CPC leadership and also in its practical activity. Mao Tse-tung and his historiographers attempt to distort the picture, to obscure the substance of the matter. They speak about many "incorrect lines" in opposition to Mao Tse-tung's "correct line", moreover, the number of "incorrect lines" listed in Peking publications is growing from year to year. They have gradually added the "Left and Right deviations" of Chu Chiu-po, Wang Ming, Peng Teh-huai, Kao-Kang, Jao Shu-shih, Liu Shao-chi and many others to the opportunist mistakes of Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san. During the years of the "cultural revolution" the bulk of the Party cadres were labelled "vested with power in the Party but following the capitalist road". Afterwards it turned out that some were "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type", a Maoist designation for Lin Piao and his supporters.

The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist members of the CPC guided themselves by the works of Lenin and by documents of the Comintern and the CPSU relating to the struggle of the Chinese peo-

ple. Among their guidelines were: definition of the Chinese revolution as a combination of a struggle against feudal survivals and a struggle against imperialism; a course towards development of the peasant movement, of a revolutionary struggle in the rural areas and the establishment of strongholds in periods of decline of the revolution; orientation towards an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution; the thesis that in China the armed revolution combats the armed counter-revolution; the steering of a course towards an alliance of the Chinese revolutionaries with the Soviet Union. These guidelines led the Communist Party of China to successes and, in the final analysis, ensured the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949.

The petty-bourgeois nationalist line, on the other hand, did not make, nor could it have made, any positive contribution to the growth of the communist movement in China. The revolutionary movement suffered defeats and setbacks whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists deliberately or unknowingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist guidelines and led the Party astray.

The fact that the activity of the Communist Party of China after 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek and his clique seized power, took place in a harsh reign of terror, had a substantial influence on the course and results of the struggle between these two lines. The central Kuomintang government, the provincial militarist cliques, the troops of the Western imperialists and the Japanese invaders fought the Communists with equal ferocity. The

Chinese Communists displayed great heroism in the struggle for the emancipation of the working people. The majority of the tried and tested Communist Party leaders, as well as a great number of the Party's finest sons, were killed in these battles.

In 1927 reactionary Chinese generals murdered Li Ta-chao; Chang Tai-lei was also killed. They executed Peng Pai in Shanghai two years later. In 1935 members of the Kuomintang shot Chu Chiu-po. That same year they brutally murdered Fang Chih-min, a glorious hero of the Chinese Red Army.

Thousands of Chinese Communists were slaughtered by the Kuomintang. In the first six months after the Chiang Kai-shek coup in 1927 the membership of the Communist Party of China was reduced from 50,000 to 10,000. The repressions against the Communists of Shanghai as a result of treachery in the early thirties inflicted new great losses on the Party.

The Party suffered tremendous losses in the period when the Chinese Red Army retreated from the central to the northwestern districts of the country. According to official Chinese data, the membership of the CPC fell from 300,000 in 1934 to 40,000 in 1937.

All told, about 400,000 CPC members and sympathisers, including nearly all the Communists in the urban Party cells, among the working class, were killed between 1927 and 1935. Most of the old Party cadres, including many of the most experienced leaders, were wiped out. This was a tragedy for the Communist Party of China.

In substance, all of the Party's work was con-

centrated in the army units it controlled and at several strongpoints situated far from China's main political centres and far from the main mass of the proletariat. For a long time the Party grew chiefly through the influx of peasants, members of the petty bourgeoisie, people from the exploiter classes and intellectuals. The inflow of industrial workers into the CPC practically stopped. The pressure of small property owners on the Party grew stronger.

It was in this period that the petty-bourgeois nationalistic elements, headed by Mao Tse-tung, succeeded in consolidating their positions in the Communist Party's leadership, which had been weakened by the big losses, and in the army. They relied for support on the army, on the one hand, and on the peasant masses, on declassed elements, on the other hand. It is highly indicative that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters did not balk at profoundly anti-Party, conspiratorial methods of struggle against their ideological opponents inside the CPC. The meaning and significance of this were fully revealed only three decades later.

The conditions of that period compelled the Maoists to keep their actions in the mainstream of the people's struggle. The enthusiasm of the masses and the vital necessity of obtaining internationalist support, primarily from the Soviet Union and from all liberation forces, dictated to the leadership of the Communist Party of China the only possible road—the road of revolutionary struggle. Despite all their nationalist aspirations the Maoists could not help taking into account the fact that the political situation in the international

arena and also in China itself left them no other choice.

The Communist Party of China led the struggle against foreign imperialist oppression and headed the victorious people's revolution. It should be emphasised that *the victory of the Chinese working people in 1949 was made possible by the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism and the liberation of Northeast China by the Soviet Army.* In the period from 1945 to 1949 the centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement shifted to Manchuria where, with assistance from the Soviet Union, active preparations were made for the final stage of the struggle to free China from colonial and social oppression.

The defeat of militarist Japan and the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to that defeat strengthened the revolutionary forces of China. The People's Liberation Army was guaranteed a stable hinterland and the possibility of reactivating and improving its equipment at the expense of Japanese materiel captured by the Soviet troops.

During the years of resistance to Japanese militarism hundreds upon hundreds of officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army received military training in the Soviet Far East. Soviet experts passed on to Chinese civilian cadres their experience in all fields of government administration and economic management.

The Soviet Army and Soviet civilian organisations gave China's revolutionary forces large-scale material assistance. In particular, they provided all-round help in developing the Manchurian economy and speedily restoring the wrecked com-

munication lines. The dedicated efforts of Soviet railwaymen helped to put the main lines in central and southern Manchuria into operation in a short time and to regroup and mass the troops of the People's Liberation Army. This contributed to the final defeat of the Kuomingtang forces and to their complete expulsion from Manchuria, which paved the way for the general offensive southwards.

In the areas which the Soviet Army liberated from the Japanese invaders, the Chinese people received the opportunity to freely express their will. They began to set up people's democratic governing bodies.

In that period the Soviet Government took all steps to prevent open armed intervention by the United States in China, in the first place, in Manchuria.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union gave the leadership of the CPC important assistance at that time in drafting a correct political line. The visits by Chinese delegations from the people's democratic districts of Manchuria to the Soviet Union in 1945 and in June 1949 and also other forms of consultation were very useful. (From 1945 onwards Soviet Party workers were in Manchuria for operational contacts with the Northeastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC; at the beginning of 1949 there was a meeting between a high-ranking representative of the CPSU and Chinese leaders.) This help was important because the petty-bourgeois nationalist section of the CPC leadership, Mao Tse-tung above all, shifted from one extreme to another in assessing the possibilities of the Chinese revolu-

tion. For example, in 1945 and 1946 Mao Tse-tung and his supporters exaggerated these possibilities, displayed "revolutionary impatience" and ignored the need to preserve their forces so as, by combining political and diplomatic forms of struggle with the building up of their military potential, to properly pave the way for a decisive blow. On the contrary, in 1948 and 1949, after the Kuomintang offensive and the loss of Yenan in 1947, they expressed a lack of faith in the possibility of an early victory and failed to plan the practical aspects of the establishment of people's power throughout China.

Thanks to its developed industries, its sizeable working class and its strong Party organisations, as well as the proximity of the Soviet Union, Manchuria became, in the years from 1945 to 1949, the *strategic springboard* from which the People's Liberation Army launched a rapid offensive and quickly freed the whole of China from Chiang Kai-shek's forces and their imperialist patrons. Two of the three decisive engagements—the battles of Liaoshen (Mukden) and Peking-Tientsin—were won by the Manchurian army group.

The fraternal alliance of Chinese revolutionaries with the Soviet Union compensated for the relative weakness and fragmentation of the Chinese working class and helped to consolidate the internal forces of the Chinese revolution, defending them against the import of counter-revolution. The Chinese people's victory forcefully confirmed the indisputable correctness of Lenin's thesis that the "revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively,

can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism".[1]

In the fifties the People's Republic of China launched an active struggle against survivals of feudalism, carried out important social transformations, completed the tasks of the democratic revolution and created the prerequisites for success in building a socialist society. The petty-bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership were compelled to work painstakingly to camouflage their long-standing schemes because they saw how unpopular great-power, nationalist ideas were in the Party and among the people. The large-scale assistance which China received from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and China's application of the international experience of building socialism hampered the manoeuvres of the Maoists and strengthened the internationalist trend in China and in the CPC.

In the late fifties, however, the nationalist trend in the Party leadership resurfaced once again. With increasing frequency Mao Tse-tung and his adherents grossly violated the Leninist teaching on the Party; they ignored the theory and practice of scientific socialism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. In the light of Maoism's previous history this shift was not accidental, although, on the other hand, it cannot be regarded as having been inevitable and predetermined.

Today, as before, Lenin's instructions on the importance and vital necessity for the Communist

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 151.

Party of working out a correct policy, of relying on the working class, of leading the peasantry but not becoming dissolved in it are especially relevant in a country where the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie constitute the bulk of the population. The situation in China shows what can happen when a Communist Party ignores these instructions of Lenin's and allows itself to be overwhelmed by the petty-bourgeois, anarchistic element, when its internationalist ties with other fraternal parties and countries are disrupted.

The nationalism and adventurism inherent in petty-bourgeois revolutionaries gradually gained the upper hand in the policy of the CPC leadership. As noted above, *these qualities were most openly manifested in the activity of Mao Tse-tung*, and therefore it is particularly important for Marxist historians to examine Mao Tse-tung's true role in the Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung's Emergence As a Political Leader

Mao Tse-tung's development as a political leader followed a complicated and contradictory road. For a long time his name was linked up in one way or another with various episodes of the Chinese people's efforts to gain emancipation. Great difficulties arise in the way of an objective analysis of Mao's activity, however, difficulties that follow not only from the paucity of published materials but also from the patent falsification of facts by the official Chinese historiography and Maoist propaganda.

Mao Tse-tung is flesh of the flesh of backward, semi-feudal China. He grew up in the family of a well-to-do peasant, and the environment, ideology, sentiments and motives of small property owners were incomparably closer to him than the proletarian world outlook. He wholly accepted the great-power chauvinism which had been cultivated in China by the emperors and which later became the ideology of the Chinese bourgeoisie, small property owners and intelligentsia.

The views of Mao Tse-tung were shaped by trends of the most diverse type. Telling the American journalist Edgar Snow, in 1936, of the time he attended a teacher training school in Changsha, which he finished in 1918, Mao Tse-tung said: "At this time my mind was a curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism, and Utopian Socialism. I had somewhat vague passions for nineteenth-century democracy, Utopianism and old-fashioned liberalism. . . ." Describing his first visit to Peking, made after finishing school, that is a year and a half or two before, in his own words, he "became a Marxist", Mao noted that he had read several pamphlets about anarchism and had been impressed by them. At that time he approved of many of its propositions.

Besides corresponding with other anarchists Mao Tse-tung considered organising an anarchist society. Edgar Snow, to this day practically Mao's only biographer who obtained his information at first hand, said that before Mao became a Communist (when about 30) he had changed his ideological views at least seven times, progressing from Buddhism through monarchism to socialism.

Contrary to the claims made today by official Chinese historiography, *Mao Tse-tung was not closely connected with the working-class movement and did not make a deep study of Marxism-Leninism, of scientific socialism.* In the first half of the twenties he was active only in the student and youth movement. After joining the CPC in 1921 he kept apart from the proletariat. His social contacts were limited to urban young people, bourgeois intellectuals and the petty-bourgeois environment.

Active in the Kuomintang, Mao Tse-tung was secretary of its Shanghai organisation in 1923 and 1924; in 1925 and 1926 he headed the agitation and propaganda department of the Kuomintang Central Committee and was a candidate for membership of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. As such, this might not have been objectionable because co-operation with the Kuomintang was then an official line of the CPC. However, Mao's close ties with prominent bourgeois politicians exerted an influence on him because of his ideological instability. Chinese Communists who worked together with him recall that he was removed from the Central Committee of the CPC in the middle of the twenties for having been too close to the Kuomintang.

For a long time Mao Tse-tung was not ranked among the leading functionaries of the Party. In the twenties he was known chiefly as a public leader in Hunan Province. It is indicative that Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po and other prominent Chinese Marxists of the period did not mention Mao Tse-tung among the major Party leaders.

Mao Tse-tung was absent from a number of CPC congresses. He confessed to Edgar Snow that he failed to attend the Second Congress because he had forgotten the name of the place where it was to be held. He was absent from the Fourth Congress because of illness. He attended the Fifth Congress as a delegate with a voice but no vote. He was absent from the Sixth Congress, held in Moscow in 1928. Today Peking propaganda claims that all events in the history of the CPC in which Mao did not take part (including the congresses just mentioned) harmed the Chinese revolution or, at best, had no significance. Naturally Peking propaganda does not put into that category the Seventh Congress, which consolidated Maoist control over the Party, let alone the Ninth Congress, which registered the establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China.

Having no knowledge of foreign languages Mao Tse-tung could not read Marxist writings in the original. In his formative years as a political leader very few of even the main classical writings of Marxism-Leninism had been translated into Chinese. He got his introduction to philosophy and political economy from popular pamphlets by Chinese authors, pamphlets that often abounded in errors.

The level of Mao's Marxist-Leninist knowledge is illustrated by two articles he contributed to the magazine *Chungo Tsinian* at the beginning of 1926, when already a member of the CPC. The articles, entitled "The Different Classes of the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitude to the Chinese Revolution" and "An Analysis of the Dif-

ferent Classes of Chinese Society", were extremely confused on cardinal questions of Marxism and displayed an obvious inability to apply the main categories of Marxism to an analysis of the social structure of society. Suffice it to say that according to Mao Tse-tung the population of any country is divided into five categories: the big, middle and petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletariat and the proletariat. Applying this pattern to the rural areas of China he concluded that "the big landowners are classified together with the big bourgeoisie, the small landowners—with the middle bourgeoisie, the independent peasants with the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-tenants with the semi-proletariat and the farm labourers with the proletariat". (Incidentally, the first of these two articles was not included in the four-volume edition of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works*; the other one was included in this edition but with big deletions and completely revised, under the title "On the Classes of Chinese Society".)

Soviet citizens who came into close contact with Mao Tse-tung in the forties confirm that no substantial changes took place in his Marxist-Leninist education in that period either. There were no books by foreign authors in his home, not a single translated work of fiction or poetry; there was only a very small number of translations of classical works of Marxism-Leninism. "His reference books were a complete collection of Chinese dictionaries, ancient treatises and ancient Chinese fiction and poetry, and it was from these that he drew his wisdom."

In moments of frankness Mao Tse-tung himself

gave a fairly realistic assessment of his Marxist-Leninist knowledge. In his pamphlet *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, published in 1957, he admitted: "I myself had all sorts of non-Marxist ideas before. It was only later that I embraced Marxism. I learned a little Marxism from books and so made an initial remoulding of my ideas, but it was mainly through taking part in the class struggle over the years that I came to be remoulded. And I must continue to study if I am to make further progress, otherwise I shall lag behind."

"I also read a few books by the founders of Marxism; I do not know how many they wrote...," Mao said in an interview with Chinese journalists in March 1957. "I received a bourgeois upbringing; partly, a feudal upbringing, as a matter of fact," he said in November of the same year. "I studied quite a few books by Confucius and his followers. At that time we did not know Marx and Engels at all, but only knew about the existence of Washington and Napoleon." "I did not make a thorough study of all the departments of Marxism," he repeated in September 1959. "Nor did I know any foreign languages, for instance, and I had just begun to study economics..."

It was not self-criticism, however, but excessive conceit and a belief in his own infallibility that took the upper hand. The absurd claim that "the thought of Mao surpasses" the teaching of Marx and Lenin was put forward clearly with his approval.

Mao and his supporters had long been prepar-

ing the ground for this. In the thirties and forties they had spread a theory claiming that Marxism was not suitable for China. In the early forties Mao had openly declared that "the Marxist-Leninist teaching is not applicable to the Chinese conditions because of China's specificity". In talks with Soviet people in Yenan he said that "a knowledge of the theory of Marxism-Leninism is not obligatory in order to govern China".

It was in this period that Mao and his followers began to oppose the so-called "thought of Mao" to the Marxist-Leninist teaching and to extol his personality. The method they used is typical of Maoist ideological and political tactics.

There was a time when Mao Tse-tung urged close co-ordination of the revolutionary struggle with the experience of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, stressing however, that "the revolution in China and the Chinese Red Army have many special features of their own". But later he began to differentiate the Chinese methods more and more from the world revolutionary experience, opposing the former to the latter and turning them into a dogma. He attempted to prove that the revolution in China had to follow a special road and preferred to speak about "Marxism in the national form" instead of "the universal truth of Marxism"; in other words, instead of creatively applying Marxism-Leninism he urged the development of national and regional forms of Marxism-Leninism and revision "of the general truths of Marxism" from that standpoint. Furthermore, he revised, in effect, the main Marxist principles and represented this "Chinese

version of Marxism" as being "the universal truth".

The Seventh Congress officially proclaimed "the thought of Mao" as the guiding ideology of the Communist Party of China. The report on the Party Rules emphasised that Mao Tse-tung "had *cast aside* outdated conclusions in Marxist theory which did not apply to the concrete conditions of Chinese reality and *had replaced them by new propositions and new conclusions*.... Therefore, he was able to successfully carry out this difficult and tremendous task of Sinicising Marxism."

The Party Rules adopted at the Seventh Congress declared: "The Communist Party of China guides itself in all its activity by the thought of Mao Tse-tung...."

As Mao's elevation went ahead such traits of character as love of power and an exaggerated opinion of his own abilities became more and more apparent. M. Borodin, an old Bolshevik who was political adviser to the revolutionary government in the south of China and had close contacts with Mao Tse-tung in the twenties, noted that Mao "was excessively self-assured" and that "he considered himself to be a theoretician who had independently made a valuable contribution to social science". Soviet citizens who worked in China in the forties pointed out "the patriarchal inclinations of Mao Tse-tung, his morbid mistrust, his excessive ambition and delusions of grandeur, elevated to a cult". "In all cases when the successes of the People's Liberation Army are ascribed to his (Mao Tse-tung's.—*Authors*) genius, he is pleased," a Soviet specialist who was in close con-

tact with Mao recalled. "I never heard him speak of the existence of the Central Committee of the Party or say that the successes of the People's Liberation Army were the successes of the Central Committee leadership."

Chinese Communists, who criticised Mao Tse-tung on more than one occasion, also noted how ambitious he was. CPC documents of 1930 stated bluntly that Mao strove "to put into practice his dreams of becoming emperor of the Party" (special circular of the Kiangsi provincial Executive Committee of December 15, 1930). Leading Party bodies of Kiangsi Province, where he worked at the time, accused Mao of Napoleonic ways and of an attempt to carry out "a Chinese Brumiere" (a letter from the Kiangsi Action Committee, December 1930). Chinese Party members who were acquainted with Mao noted with alarm that he could not tolerate objections, that he regarded himself as an infallible person and an absolute authority, that he had been brought up in a traditional domineering spirit and was obsessed by megalomania. At the Sixth CPC Congress in 1928 Mao's actions were described as "manifestations of militarist psychology".

Reading old books on the history of China and chronicles of the dynasties, and familiarising himself with the struggle of peasant leaders for power, Mao Tse-tung saw time and again that previously unknown men like Hung Hsiu-chuan (leader of the Taiping uprising in the middle of the 19th century and later emperor and "celestial ruler" on earth) became "great men" by utilising spontaneous movements of the broad masses. *Mao Tse-tung*

pinned his main political hopes on a spontaneous movement of this kind, especially since a long overdue agrarian revolution—a peasant anti-feudal war—was flaring up more and more intensively in China in the twenties.

Gradually Mao Tse-tung concentrated his work almost exclusively in the rural areas. He stepped aside from the acute revolutionary clashes that took place in the cities in the twenties and thirties. During the Movement of May 4 of 1919, which is regarded as the first action of political struggle by the Chinese proletariat as a class, Mao was in Hunan. He was also in Hunan during the Movement of May 30 in 1925 (the shooting down of an anti-imperialist demonstration and the general strike in Shanghai). When the participants in the Northern March left Kwangtung Province he was also in Hunan.

Mao Tse-tung evaded clandestine organisational work in the revolutionary movement in the cities, leaving the entire burden of this work, and also the risk connected with the reactionary reign of terror there, to other Communists.

In the spring of 1925 Mao Tse-tung organised peasant unions in villages of Hunan Province but at the end of the summer, after suffering a setback, he fled from Hunan to Canton (Kwangchow), seeking the protection of the revolutionary government headed by Sun Yat-sen. Here he took part in the work of study courses for organisers of the peasant movement.

In the spring of 1926 Mao worked in the Peasant Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. After Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution-

ary coup in 1927 Mao became Chairman of the All-China Peasants' Union.

The peasants were an important factor in the emancipatory struggle in China, but Mao Tse-tung exaggerated this factor and opposed the peasantry to other strata of society, especially the working class. In 1927 he delivered his "Report on a Study of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province" in which he amplified views on the purely peasant nature of the Chinese revolution. It is indicative that this lengthy document which enthusiastically glorified the spontaneous strength of the peasant masses did not contain a single word about the working class or about the historic mission of the proletariat in the struggle for the emancipation of all working people. On the other hand, the report abounded in statements about "the historic mission of the peasants", their "faultless intuition", "powerful revolutionary spirit" and "insuperable" strength, claiming that the peasants "verify all revolutionary parties and groups, all revolutionaries, in order either to accept or reject them".

Mao Tse-tung persistently expounded the same ideas in public speeches and private conversations. M. Borodin noted Mao's "mistaken view of the peasantry. He bases himself on an inner conviction that the peasantry are superior to the other classes, on an exaggeration of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, and, at the same time, on an underestimation of the proletariat's leading role. Mao Tse-tung expressed this viewpoint of his many times in private conversations. . . ." Further: "Mao Tse-tung clearly underestimated

the role of the proletariat as initiator and leader of the Chinese revolution, as the leader of the Chinese peasantry. This was characteristic of Mao Tse-tung's speeches in the twenties; while in China I had many occasions to hear him."

In his speeches Mao Tse-tung persistently propounded the idea that "the village is the strongpoint of the revolution"; that "work in the village should play the main role in the Chinese revolutionary movement, and work in the towns an auxiliary role", that it was necessary "to subordinate work in the towns to work in the rural areas", "to shift the centre of gravity of the work to the villages", and so on. At the Seventh CPC Congress he stated bluntly: "You can read a lot of Marx but if you forget the word 'peasantry' it will be fruitless and useless. . . ."

Mao Tse-tung realised that to become the leader of a spontaneous movement he had to stand forth as a herald of a doctrine or idea that was dear to the hearts of the working people. By the time Mao began his political activity a momentous event had taken place in the history of mankind: the Great October Socialist Revolution had triumphed in Russia, demonstrating the invincible strength of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the transformation of society. When Mao saw how tremendously popular the October Revolution was among the Chinese people he adopted Marxism and attended the First Congress of the Communist Party of China. However, subsequent events—Mao's "Sinicisation" of Marxism and then his replacement of the Marxist-Leninist teaching by the so-called "thought of Mao" in the course of the

"cultural revolution"—showed that he had used the banner of the October Revolution, the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the banner of socialism, chiefly in order to take advantage of the developing anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in China so as to attain his selfish aims.

Mao Tse-tung's Struggle for Undivided Control Over the Army and the Party

Mao Tse-tung's long battle inside the CPC was crowned, during the "cultural revolution", by the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. This was a logical outcome of the translation of the Maoists' petty-bourgeois nationalist and adventurist views into reality.

In this connection, source materials on the situation in the CPC in the thirties and forties are of special interest. It is important to analyse them because the methods the Maoists used during the "cultural revolution" are largely identical with the ones they had applied in those two decades.

Historical studies published in China extol Mao's services in the acute struggle against sundry deviationists and Right-wing renegades that went on inside the Communist Party of China. Mao was indeed active in this battle, but he and his closest supporters took advantage of it for their own purposes. Moreover, Mao shared many of the views of the men against whom he was supposedly fighting. While waving the flag of Marxism he retained his petty-bourgeois nationalist views, although

he painstakingly disguised them with Marxist phraseology.

As early as the thirties, leading Party bodies of Kiangsi Province described him as follows: "Mao Tse-tung is a crafty politician. Therefore, even inside the Party he did not give up his old art.... He wove intrigues inside the Party, inciting squabbles among members, which was his favourite and usual method. He dreamed of building up *a clique of his own* and of destroying the Party organisation" (from a letter by the Kiangsi Action Committee of the CPC to the Action Committee of Southeastern Hunan, dated December 25, 1930). "The method of intrigues and of setting some high-ranking functionaries against others is an old tactic of Mao Tse-tung's," Chinese Communists noted.

A Soviet official who came into close contact with Mao in the forties noted that there was "a measure of theatricality" in his conduct. He wrote about Mao's ability to "speak politely ... and to act with extreme inconsistence". Mao regarded this trait to be a specific feature of the Chinese character and repeatedly advised others "to remember this and learn to apply it".

Another of Mao's characteristic traits is brutality in fighting political opponents. In his "Report on a Study of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province" Mao declared that "the revolution is not a dinner-party" and urged "ruthless actions"; he said that "a short period of terror is necessary in every village", and that "to straighten it out you have to bend it backwards; if you do not bend it backwards you will not straighten it out."

The fact that in striving to subjugate everything and everybody Mao is ready to sacrifice even the people closest to him is also typical of his personality. A case in point is Mao An-ying, Mao's eldest son by his second wife. After spending some time in the Soviet Union as a student, Mao An-ying returned to Yenan in 1946. The knowledge which his son had acquired in the Soviet Union irritated Mao, and very soon afterwards he sent his son to a village to live with a well-to-do peasant there and to "study the life" of China. On his return from the countryside Mao An-ying continued to debate theoretical questions with his father. After one of the debates Mao An-ying, in a conversation with a comrade, called his father "a false leader" and accused him of building up a "cult of the leader". When Chiang Ching, Mao's fourth wife, heard this, she immediately denounced her stepson to Mao Tse-tung. There was a big inquiry in which Chou En-lai took part. They forced Mao An-ying to write an explanation and to make slanderous statements about his stay in the Soviet Union.

After this incident Mao forbade his son to come close to his residence without special permission. Mao An-ying told someone in confidence that he could expect any kind of reprisal by his father, including "accidental" murder. In 1950 he went to Korea together with Chinese volunteers, and soon after was killed there in circumstances that remain hazy.

After the revolutionary forces in the cities of China were smashed in 1927 the question of creating revolutionary centres based on the peasant

movement, which continued to develop, became acute. The Comintern advised the Chinese revolutionaries to take this course of action. Soon after, they set up strongpoints in various parts of the country. Following the example of the leaders of peasant uprisings of the past, Mao Tse-tung took advantage of the situation to form armed detachments and to put them under his control. He took refuge for a long time in the mountains of Chingkangshan. Meanwhile the people waged a heroic armed struggle against the enemies of the revolution. When an uprising broke out in the city of Canton and the famous Canton Commune was set up Mao did not come to its aid despite insistent demands by many of those who were in the mountains together with him.

Chinese official historiography keeps silent about Mao's activity as a Party leader in that period. However, we know from a report and a debate on peasant partisan warfare, held in the military department of the Central Committee of the CPC in February 1929, that in the areas controlled by Mao's detachments "the Red Army has completely replaced mass organisations and the local Party committees", that "in most places people join the Red Army not because of their vital interests but because they fear it" and that "military discipline has ousted Party discipline. Very often comrades who have made mistakes are punished by being put before a firing squad".

Already in those years the cult of Mao's personality was forcibly implanted; peasants were compelled to perform a rite of bowing before his portrait.

A number of speakers at the Sixth Congress of the CPC in July 1928 described Mao's troops as "flying armies" that "were somewhat like bandits". In one of its letters to Mao Tse-tung in 1928 the Central Committee of the CPC noted, among other of his mistakes and shortcomings, that "little attention was paid to developing and mobilising the masses to carry out an agrarian revolution" and that Mao had "a passion for purely military action"; a lack of contact with "the partisan war of the broad peasant masses"; "military adventurism and vagabondage"; a "policy of aimless and haphazard raids and murders".

Mao Tse-tung's position as the sole leader of the Liberated Area in Chingkangshan became complicated after the arrival there of troops headed by Chu Teh in 1928. (Lin Piao commanded a company under Chu Teh, and Mao contributed to his rapid promotion; in 1930 Lin Piao was in command of a corps of the Red Army). By this time Chu Teh had become widely known in China as the leader of revolutionary army units and enjoyed great prestige among the population. Mao Tse-tung had to take this into account. Chu Teh became the commander of a Red Army group formed from amalgamated detachments, while Mao became its political commissar.

In January 1929 the troops headed by Chu Teh and Mao left Chingkangshan and made their way to the town of Juikin, which became the centre of a new liberated area known as the Central Revolutionary Base. Here Mao took forceful steps to push Chu Teh into the background. Chinese Communists wrote at that time: "...Mao wants to con-

centrate power in his own hands.... Mao does not miss an occasion to criticise Chu, and he does this at all meetings ... attempting ... to undermine Chu Teh's prestige completely...."

It was clear that Mao Tse-tung wanted to consolidate his influence in the army and then to use it to establish control over the Party. Mao's choice of this line of action is explained by the fact that in the twenties and thirties he did not have much prestige as a Party leader; he was not involved in top-rank Party work for a long time. When he became active as a military and Party leader his efforts evoked a negative reaction from Communists. Party documents of that period said that "Mao Tse-tung wishes to concentrate all power in his own hands" and that the masses "are dissatisfied with Mao Tse-tung"; they noted his negative aspects: lack of popularity among the masses and "manoeuvres within the Party".

Among the charges levelled at Mao were that "in the process of the decisive class struggle now under way he has displayed Right-wing vacillations, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, drew up an insidious plan to destroy Party comrades", and that "he is becoming a 100 per cent Right-wing opportunist and criminal in the developing class struggle. Mao Tse-tung strives to carry out his Right-wing opportunist ideas, his desertion ideas and other filthy and shameless aims" (a special Circular of the Kiangsi Provincial Executive Committee of December 15, 1930).

In those years Mao Tse-tung was already described as "a very crafty intriguer with exceptionally developed individualism.... He usually dom-

ineers and threatens Party members, applying a system of punishment.... As for the education of cadres, he held factional views, and on the basis of friendship he set up a group of his own as a convenient tool. In general ... far from displaying himself as a revolutionary leader Mao Tse-tung was not even a proletarian Bolshevik militant. *Mao Tse-tung was a Right-wing opportunist ... a man who wrecked the Party organisation.... He is indisputably a renegade from the Communist Party.*" That was how Chinese Communists assessed Mao Tse-tung's activity as long ago as 1930.

After concentrating power in the region of the Central Revolutionary Base in his own hands Mao Tse-tung ignored the CPC Central Committee, which then had its headquarters in Shanghai. "Mao Tse-tung has long been against the Central Committee," the document cited above declared. "He rejected and deliberately failed to carry out repeated instructions (of the Central Committee).... He retyped and circulated among the lower Party organisations very few of the Central Committee circulars which he received. He had no consideration for functionaries who had been sent from the Centre and, besides, deliberately put all kinds of obstacles in their way.... The Central Committee repeatedly sent letters suggesting the transfer of Mao Tse-tung to other work, but he did not heed them."

The following instance, which Liu Ti, an army Communist, described in a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC in 1931, is typical:

"On August 1 (1930) a letter came from the Central Committee announcing that Comrade Hsi-

ang Chung-fa (who had been elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC at the Sixth Party Congress.—*Authors*) was Chairman of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government of China. However, Mao Tse-tung continued to issue orders, signing them as Chairman of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee of China."

Mao Tse-tung did not even stop at murder in his fight against Communists who disagreed with him. Worthy of note in this connection are the events that took place in the town of Futien in December 1930. On Mao's orders, troops that were loyal to him raided Party, local governmental and YCL organisations in Kiangsi Province and carried out brutal repressions against their leaders.

Here are some details which did not become known until many years later.

On December 3, 1930, Mao Tse-tung granted dictatorial powers to the Central Front Committee, which he headed. "Henceforth," he declared in an order, "all power is vested in the Central Front Committee. It is in charge of all military, political and Party affairs." He outlawed the Kiangsi Provincial Party Committee and called an extraordinary Party Conference, to take place in the town of Futien on December 8. In the early hours of December 7, when the delegates had gathered in Futien, a company of soldiers under the command of one of the men loyal to Mao Tse-tung entered the town and arrested the delegates, the Kiangsi Provincial Party Committee, the YCL Committee and the heads of the provincial bodies of Soviet power. All told, they arrested 120 per-

sons. In justification of these actions the Maoists spread rumours that the arrested persons were members of the AB-Union, a counter-revolutionary anti-Bolshevik organisation.[1]

An account of the events in Futien declared: "Next they began to apply torture, using kerosene, smouldering wicks, and so on.... If the interrogation and torture failed to produce a confession, the torture was intensified ... the butchers broke people's fingernails and burned their whole bodies ... the unceasing screams of the tortured persons were to be heard.... Their wives were also arrested, among them the wife of Comrade Pai Fan (Secretary of the Kiangsi Committee of the CPC); the arrested persons were bound, stripped naked and tortured; the torturers beat them on the hands with sharp instruments, cut out their breasts and burned their genital organs.... They took 50 people off to be executed ... some of them had not even been interrogated...."

On December 25, 1930, the Kiangsi Action Committee wrote: "Wishing to maintain his position, Mao Tse-tung planned the physical destruction of the leading Party and Young League cadres of Kiangsi Province and the establishment of a party of his own as an instrument to combat the Central Committee. The events of December 7 were staged to carry out these plans of Mao Tse-tung's."

Later Mao Tse-tung indirectly admitted his complicity in the brutal events of that time. "In

[1] The Anti-Bolshevik Union was a counter-revolutionary organisation of landowners, kulaks and the like who fought the Chinese Communists and the Red Army.

1930 the beating of persons during interrogation was widely employed in the Red Army," he related in 1956. "At that time I myself witnessed the beating of accused persons."

In general, many things in the history of the CPC in that period still await study and elucidation. In particular, the real circumstances of the large-scale arrests in Shanghai in the thirties, as a result of which many leading figures, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, were killed. Incidentally, the man in charge of security in the Central Committee of the CPC at that time was Kang-Sheng, one of the main organisers of the "cultural revolution" of the sixties, who directly guided the attacks against Party organisations and the persecution of Party cadres.

In November 1931 Mao Tse-tung convened the First All-China Congress of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies in Juikin. He became Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and simultaneously Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government. This was an attempt to gain support in the bodies of Soviet power in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party, which was situated outside the Central Base.

In this period Mao Tse-tung clashed with Chou En-lai, a prominent figure in the Party. Located as it was in Shanghai, the Central Committee of the CPC could not substantially influence the state of affairs in the Central Revolutionary Base. When it sent Chou En-lai to Juikin, Mao Tse-

tung reacted most bitterly. An acute struggle flared up between them. Mao failed to win the support of the majority at a conference of the Central Committee of the CPC held in Ningtu in August 1932, and he was removed from the top military and Party posts in the Central Area.

In 1931, as a result of a series of failures in Shanghai, CC CPC General Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa was arrested and then executed. This was followed by a new rout of the CPC Central Committee by the Kuomintang secret police, its surviving members moving to the Liberated Area.

With the transfer of the Central Committee of the CPC to the territory of the Central Revolutionary Base the inner-Party struggle became more intensive and Mao was compelled to postpone for a time his plans of rising to power. The situation became still more complicated because the Kuomintang forces mounted five campaigns against the "Red areas". The last of these campaigns inflicted heavy defeats on the Red Army. The Kuomintang troops captured strongpoints in Central and South China. The Red Army was forced to make a year-long retreat known as the Long March, which ended when its remnants reached the hinterland of Northwest China.

These defeats were mainly due to Mao Tse-tung's incorrect agrarian and military policies. As a result of the arbitrary actions by the Maoists during their long period of rule in the Liberated Area the local population began to give less support to the Red Army. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung's tactical concepts (such as the formula: "The enemy

advances, we retreat") undermined the Red Army's capacity to offer resistance.

As a member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Mao coolly looked on as the forces and gains of the revolutionary movement were wiped out before his eyes. He himself said that in this period "the strength of the Chinese Red Army fell from 300,000 to 25,000; the area of the Soviet districts of China was reduced by 99 per cent, the CPC organisations in the towns were smashed by the Kuomintang and CPC membership dropped from 300,000 to 26,000".

It is indicative that there is no evidence whatever of Mao Tse-tung having made a single major speech in that most difficult period. There is reason to believe that he deliberately kept silent in the hope of later blaming the Chinese Red Army's setbacks on the Comintern and on the CPC leaders who were close to it. As a matter of fact, he afterwards represented himself as having been "the saviour" of the Party.

Mao Tse-tung bided his time. A convenient moment came when the troops led by the Communists were in outlying districts and had no communication at all with the country's main proletarian centres.

In January 1935 Mao Tse-tung called a meeting in the hamlet of Tsunyi which played a crucial part in the history of the CPC. The official Chinese assessment of this event declares: "The meeting in Tsunyi marked the end of the domination of the 'Left' deviation in the Central Commit-

tee, and, particularly, of the mistakes of the 'Left' opportunists on military matters; it placed Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the helm of the Party and the Central Committee. In this way, in the most tense, exceptionally difficult moment of the Long March, the Party preserved and tempered the core of the Red Army and led itself and the cause of the revolution out of the critical situation." Maoist propaganda claims that "from this time on an end was put once and for all to the domination of opportunism in the Central Committee of the Party".

According to testimony which has come down to us (in particular, an article in a June 1969 issue of *Horizont*, a weekly magazine published in the German Democratic Republic, by Otto Braun, a German Communist who took part in the Long March and was at the meeting in Tsunyi) this meeting, which in Chinese writings is called "an enlarged sitting of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC", was an unusual gathering. In substance, all its decisions were taken by 30 to 35 army men from units controlled by Mao.

There was no voting either on the resolution or on organisational questions. The reorganisation of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was simply announced. Mao Tse-tung, who earlier had held the posts of Chairman of the Revolutionary Government and of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Red Army, seized the key positions in the CPC leadership.

After the Tsunyi meeting Mao Tse-tung, disregarding the realities of the situation, launched an intensive policy of "active hostilities against the enemy". This led to crippling losses for the Red

Army. As a result, the troops which, together with Mao, reached the Yenan area numbered less than 10,000 men.

How the Maoists Fought the Chinese Communists-Internationalists

In October 1935 the surviving Red Army units reached a revolutionary strongpoint in Northwest China which had been set up by the guerrilla units operating under the command of Liu Chih-tan, a popular hero, and Kao Kang, a prominent Chinese revolutionary and internationalist.

Here a Liberated Area with its administrative centre in Yenan (Shensi Province) had arisen.

Many books have been written in China about the Yenan period but they do not go into the methods by which Mao Tse-tung took advantage of his more than ten-year stay in Yenan to carry to completion his bitter struggle to establish undivided personal control over the Party. The decisive role in this struggle was played by the so-called "movement for ordering the style of work", the substance of which consisted of *forcibly imposing the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" on the entire Party as its guiding ideology.*

At the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938 Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu) and other Chinese Communists who had been studying in the Soviet Union or working in the Comintern returned to China from Moscow to strengthen the leadership of the CPC in connection with the tactics of a united front in the war against Japan. Wang Ming delivered a report to the CPC Central Com-

mittee that met with the approval of all its members. Mao Tse-tung expressed his dissatisfaction with the united front tactics but, together with the majority, voted in favour of it.

On meeting vigorous opposition from Wang Ming and the other Chinese Communists who had returned from Moscow and who were backed by the prestige of the Comintern, Mao Tse-tung concentrated his fire against this "Moscow group", as it came to be called. The differences of opinion on this course led to a division in the CPC leadership into supporters and opponents of Mao.

Actually, the leadership of the Communist Party of China divided into two wings: one, consisting of Wang Ming and the "Moscow group", was absent from Yenan in 1938-1940 because it was in the CPC delegation to the Consultative Council of the united front. Its members were labelled "dogmatists" by Mao Tse-tung for their loyalty to the line of the Comintern; the other, headed by Mao, spent those years in Yenan.

The policy of the supporters of the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist trend in the CPC was to build up a united front with the Kuomintang and conduct active hostilities against the Japanese army. This course was in accord with the internationalist aims of the world communist movement. Mao Tse-tung, on the contrary, sabotaged this line of the Comintern. He strove to bring active operations against the Japanese to a standstill in order to preserve all his forces to continue the war against the Kuomintang. By torpedoing the united front policy he in effect facilitated the Japanese

occupation, which took a heavy toll in human life in China.

Judging by Maoist and other documents the Yenan group was not a united body. Chu Teh, member of the Politbureau, and Lin Po-tsu, Chairman of the People's Government of the Liberated Area, who remained in Yenan, held views that were close to those of the "dogmatists". There was a group which Mao Tse-tung labelled "empiricists". In the main the "empiricists" adhered to the same views as the "dogmatists", with the sole difference that they did not oppose Mao as vigorously. Among them were Chou En-lai, Peng Teh-huai, Nieh Jung-chen, Yen Chien-ying, Liu Po-cheng and others.

True to his usual tactics, Mao Tse-tung divided his ideological and political opponents, supporting some against others and inciting clashes among them. He continued this until the participants in the struggle became exhausted and then either retired from politics or else ceased resistance.

Towards the beginning of 1941 Kang-Sheng arrived in Yenan. He immediately sided with Mao Tse-tung and came down heavily on the Communists-internationalists. Soon after, with Mao's support, he was appointed chief of intelligence and counter-intelligence in the Special Area. Kang-Sheng became Mao's right-hand man in wiping out his ideological opponents who followed the line of the Comintern and sought friendship with the Soviet Union.

In the autumn of 1941, *that is, just when the attention of the Comintern and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was concentrated on*

fighting the nazi aggression, when the Soviet Union was in the throes of the most difficult period of the war against the nazis, Mao Tse-tung's group began its so-called "campaign for ordering the style of work", a campaign which, in the assessment of Soviet people then in Yenan, ended with "wholesale attacks on cadres on the grounds of the overall espionage hysteria cooked up by Kang-Sheng's organisation".

Wang Ming, for many years a member of the CPC leadership, says the following about this campaign in his pamphlet entitled *On the Events in China:*

"In preparing it and carrying it out Mao Tse-tung himself repeatedly said that he wanted to attain three aims with the help of the campaign: 1) to replace Leninism with Maoism; 2) to write the history of the Communist Party of China as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone; 3) to elevate the personality of Mao Tse-tung above the Central Committee and the entire Party. Why did he have to do it? He himself replied: this would give him two opportunities: first, to capture the top ruling place in the Party leadership and to concentrate all power in the Party in his own hands; second, once he was in the top place in the Party leadership nobody would ever be able to oust him.

"To achieve these ends he did the following in this campaign: 1) he declared Leninism to be Russian Marxism suitable only for leading the Russian revolution and unsuitable for leading the world revolution and Chinese revolution; 2) declared that the leadership and assistance of the Comintern to the CPC was entirely wrong; 3) de-

clared that the all-round support given by the CPSU and the Soviet Union to the CPC and the Chinese revolution was not only 'invalid' and 'ineffective' but even 'harmful'; 4) accused the entire Party of 'non-recognition of Maoism' and of 'loyalty to Leninism and the Comintern' and of 'adherence to the CPSU and the Soviet Union'."

In a speech delivered at the Yenan Party School Mao Tse-tung summed up the "ideological foundation" of the "campaign for ordering the style of work". Here is what Soviet workers who heard that speech say about it and its consequences:

"Mao began his speech rather well and we followed it with relative ease; everything was relevant and everything was understandable. But as he went on something incredible happened. He suddenly switched from one subject to another and without logical connection between one and the other sharply attacked invisible and intangible enemies—sectarians, dogmatists, empiricists, subjectivists—as though his audience did not consist of Communists but of some kind of semi-mythical Greek philosophers, for at the time he did not name a single one of these terrible enemies of the Party, as he called them. The more he ranted the more tangled and disjointed his speech became. We had an opportunity to observe much that was incomprehensible in the life of the Special Area. We would have regarded this event as incomprehensible, too, and soon forgotten about it, but matters took a different turn. Soon absolutely everybody in Yenan plunged into a study of Mao's speech, a speech we had not fully understood.... People continued to occupy themselves with the

speech from morning to night and literally memorised it. Meetings and rallies were devoted to it.... Then, suddenly, the authorities in Yenan began to arrest Kuomintang spies more and more frequently. Similar things had occurred before ... but now they repeated themselves with increasing speed and assumed a threatening nature."

A Soviet military journalist recalls: "When an uninitiated person reads Mao's writings and Party documents about this movement he might not be struck by anything in particular. But eyewitnesses of what actually took place view this happening as a most shameful thing; the aims and intentions of its instigators were dishonest towards the Party."

"The movement for ordering style" can be divided, for convenience, into three main stages or periods. The first, which lasted from the autumn of 1941 to the spring of 1942, consisted of "a study of the 22 documents", which included chiefly speeches by Mao Tse-tung, Kang-Sheng and other supporters of Mao. The aim at this stage was to show that Mao Tse-tung was "a great theoretician" and "the father of new ideas".

The second period, from the spring of 1942 to the spring of 1943, was devoted to "an ideological check-up of cadres" and amounted, in substance, to brutal moral and physical reprisals against Party functionaries whom Mao found unsuitable. The "campaign to expose spies" and the Party purge carried out from March 1943 until the Seventh Congress (1945) pursued the same objective.

As can be seen from the content and nature of the first stage, its main aim was to din it into the

minds of CPC members that "the thought of Mao" was the dominant ideology of the Party, in other words, to replace the Marxist-Leninist teaching by this "thought". In the second and third periods of this "movement" (to be more exact, total purge) Mao Tse-tung and his group created, in the Party and in the Liberated Area as a whole, an atmosphere of psychological terror as a background against which they could get rid of persons who disagreed with them (go so far as murdering them).

In the many years of this campaign of moral and physical violence Mao and his supporters took reprisals against all who displayed even the slightest disagreement with their policy and views. Supporters of Marxist-Leninist views, Communists-internationalists, were the central target and main victims of the repressive actions. CPC members were subjected to violent ideological pressure to take oaths of loyalty to Mao Tse-tung and his "thought". Anyone who resisted or wavered was threatened with a charge of "counter-revolutionary activity".

Wang Ming writes in *On the Events in China:*

"Mao Tse-tung artificially divided the entire Party into two groupings—the 'dogmatic' and 'empiricist' and at the same time united them as one target of his attack. He placed all the Communists who had studied in the Soviet Union or engaged in ideological and political work and also those who socially originated from the intelligentsia into the so-called 'pro-Soviet and dogmatic Wang Ming grouping'. All the Communists who were engaged in practical work or who

were of working-class and peasant social origin (this, evidently, did not refer to Chou En-lai, who had come from a family of landowners, or to some other leading figures in the CPC who had come from non-working sections of the population.—*Authors*), he placed into the so-called 'empiricist grouping.' At the same time he declared that the empiricist grouping was a 'captive and assistant' of the dogmatic grouping."

Mao Tse-tung took advantage of the dissolution of the Comintern to further his selfish, anti-Party aims. During a discussion of this question at a Politbureau meeting Mao stated: "Marxism is necessary but it must be adapted to the Chinese conditions. We must fight to uphold the national character of the CPC.... There are some people in the CPC who did not listen to the Central Committee of the CPC but obeyed only the Executive Committee of the Comintern. This section of people could place itself outside the Party."

He did not list any names but it was clear to those present that Mao was referring to the so-called "Moscow group".

A Soviet correspondent who was in Yenan in 1943 wrote that after the dissolution of the Comintern "Mao and his supporters heaved a sigh of relief. Now their hands are free. There will not even be any place for a feeling of moral responsibility. This has been made particularly clear by a statement of Mao's at that Politbureau meeting: 'Now we can hold a Party Congress'. It is believed that the screws will be tightened to the utmost against the 'dissidents' (the group of 'Muscovites' —Wang Ming and others)."

It is of interest to note that in May 1943 the Kuomintang made the following forecasts: "The contradictions in the present leadership are bound to be intensified. The internationalist group in the CPC will become weakened and the group of Mao Tse-tung, which will take the road of Sinicisation, will grow stronger. . . ."

Wholesale reprisals were carried out against dissidents under the guise of the "campaign to expose spies", launched in March 1943. "Shock work to capture spies", accompanied by daily meetings at which Mao's followers issued threats and demanded confessions of "anti-Party activity" and recanting, were organised in Yenan. An example is the meeting of about 1,000 city Party activists that took place in the conference hall of the Central Committee of the CPC in Yenan in March 1943. Soviet Communists were present. Kang-Sheng and other supporters of Mao Tse-tung were in the Presidium. First the floor was given to 12 "spies" who publicly "repented" their sins. After this Kang-Sheng spoke. He said several hundred Kuomintang agents had already been discovered but they were only a small part of the spies operating in the district, and there was even "a big percentage of spies among those present at this meeting". He urged everybody "connected with the Kuomintang intelligence service" to confess immediately, in which case they would be pardoned.

It was clear from Kang-Sheng's speech that he wielded great power and that anyone who dared to express dissatisfaction would be harshly punished. Persons especially instructed to observe the

reactions of those around them were present at the meeting. Going by various subjective criteria, they noted many members of the audience as being suspicious persons. Kang-Sheng's speech had a terrorising effect. The speech by Chu Teh, to whom this turn of events at the meeting was unexpected (although he was a member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC) did not erase this impression. Chu Teh spoke against the undeserved insulting of Communists.

"Soon after this meeting," the Soviet correspondent related, "the number of exposed spies grew to thousands.... A stage of siege was proclaimed in Yenan. Fences were built around all institutions and educational establishments and sentries were posted at the gates.... Married men were deprived of the opportunity of meeting their wives. It became very dangerous for two persons to hold a conversation in private."

More and more "spies" were exposed but they were no longer arrested because there were not enough premises for the detention of these "criminals". It became known that, for example, up to 80 per cent of the total number of employees in Kang-Sheng's department, 90 per cent in the central hospital and up to 100 per cent in other institutions had been "exposed".

One of the methods devised by Kang-Sheng's department gives an idea of how "spies" were "exposed". When a suspected person was told of the charges against him, he did not, naturally, confess because he was innocent. The charges were repeated to him again and again. He remained stubborn, and the interrogation continued. When

it grew dark the team of interrogators was replaced by another one, and in the morning a new shift of interrogators took over. A person did not hold out without sleep for more than three days before admitting the guilt ascribed to him.

Simultaneously with the "exposure of spies", and by using analogous methods, Mao and his group exposed persons whose ideas did not coincide with theirs. This was done during a so-called "campaign of repentment". Eyewitnesses related: "The exceptionally harsh regime established by the CPC leadership suppresses all inner-Party democracy. 'Repentment' campaigns of Party members are systematically conducted at Party meetings. The chairman of the meeting or someone close to the leadership announces that among those present at the meeting there are 40 or 50 persons who are Kuomintang supporters, that their names are already known to the CPC leadership, and that it would be better for them if they confessed. Everybody whose face registers puzzlement is arrested after the meeting and subjected to special interrogation. Many of them 'repent' rather than lose their lives. After this they are freed, given a generous portion of rice and their life returns to normal again."

Not only rank-and-file Communists but many CPC leaders as well were subjected to repressions and defamation. At that time Po Ku, Chang Wentien and others were classified as members of a "Right-wing opportunist and capitulatory" group. They were accused of "a dogmatic attitude to Russian (!) Marxism" and ordered "to learn Chinese Marxism".

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters forced leading members of the CPC and rank-and-file Communists to write confessions of their "sins". What the organisers of this "movement" wanted first and foremost was for the accused persons to make slanderous statements against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Another invariable part of the "repentment" was unbridled praise of Mao Tse-tung and self-castigation for having supported the views and guidelines of the Comintern. The purpose of these "educational methods" was to undermine the faith of Chinese Communists in genuine Marxism and proletarian internationalism.

In compelling the "repentants" to defame their comrades as well as themselves Mao Tse-tung created a situation in which nearly all the leaders except Mao himself and several of his closest associates were slandered or else put under suspicion. This was how Mao Tse-tung built up his reputation as an unchallenged authority, as an "infallible leader".

As Wang Ming testifies, Mao Tse-tung "also struck blows of different severity at the absolute majority of the leaders, cadres and Party members". Besides himself, Liu Shao-chi, at the time "his closest ally and comrade-in-arms", and some of the so-called "born Maoists", all the leaders and cadres were described as "elements suspected of counter-revolution", while all the Party organisations in the Kuomintang areas were slandered as being "counter-revolutionary organisations which, under cover of the red banner, are acting against the red banner". Wang Ming continues: "Employing diverse methods of deception, slander,

threats and coercion he (Mao) compelled all of them to admit that they were either dogmatists or empiricists, that is 'captives and assistants of the dogmatists', and that, of course, all without exception carried out the above-mentioned so-called 'Left' or 'Right' line of Wang Ming. Moreover, by similar methods and cruel torture he compelled a considerable part of the Communists and YCL members to confess that they were 'traitors', 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'spies of the Kuomintang, the imperialists and the Soviet Union'. Many of those who did not confess to being such criminals were arrested or killed, or they committed suicide. This continued for more than three years."

When pressure, persuasion and intimidation failed to produce the desired effect the organisers of the "movement for ordering the style of work" resorted to the most barbarian methods to get rid of their ideological opponents. In his pamphlet *On the Events in China* Wang Ming recalls that he was severely poisoned with drugs at that time.

Kao-Kang, former member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, related that cadres were tortured after having been falsely accused. Kao-Kang was himself arrested and tortured. He was kept outdoors in freezing weather and was "played with like a ball"—placed in the centre of a circle of men who beat him without letting him fall to the ground. The torturers burned his right thigh.

The repressive measures carried out by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters during the "movement for ordering the style of work" did the CPC

great damage. According to some estimates, Kang-Sheng and his department killed several hundred thousand people in those years. To all practical intents, the most steeled revolutionary cadres of the CPC were wiped out or their spirit was broken during that campaign.

In conversations with P. F. Yudin, who lectured in the People's Republic of China in August 1950, Chinese leaders admitted that "during the battle against spies and other enemies of the Party in Yenan a vastly greater number of persons were suspected of being hostile, and many honest people were subjected to repressions". At that time, as they said, *half of the Party activists* were in one way or another subjected to repressions and various kinds of punishment.

A Soviet officer who worked in Yenan in that period recalled in the sixties: "The leaders of the CPC, especially Mao Tse-tung, acted at that time like militarists, and not Communists. The system of rule was purely dictatorial. All dissenters were physically exterminated. This was done by Kang-Sheng, virtually Mao Tse-tung's right-hand man. Arrested persons were brutally tortured in Kang-Sheng's dungeons and then their heads were chopped off."

The methods of reprisal employed by Kang-Sheng came in for criticism in the speeches by several delegates at the Seventh Congress of the CPC in 1945. They called Kang-Sheng an executioner. However, he continued to hold responsible posts in the CPC leadership. However, in 1948 he was removed from the Politbureau for "Leftist deviations in his work", relieved of his

post of Chief of the Special Department and sent to Shantung Province. After the formation of the People's Republic of China, Kang-Sheng was again promoted to responsible posts. At the Eighth CPC Congress in 1956 he was elected a candidate-member of the Politbureau on Mao Tse-tung's personal initiative, and in 1962 he was made a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC. In September 1966 the Hsinhua Agency reported that Kang-Sheng had been made a member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee and also of the Politbureau's Permanent Committee. At the Ninth CPC Congress, Kang-Sheng was "elected" a member of the Permanent Committee of the Politbureau.

Thanks to the "movement for ordering style" and, especially, to the campaign to "expose spies" and "the repentance campaign", Mao Tse-tung's group managed to gain the upper hand over the supporters of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in the CPC leadership. In the atmosphere of physical and moral terror many of the accused persons confessed mistakes and gave assurances that "henceforward they would unswervingly carry out the 'Mao Tse-tung line' ".

In this way the ideological and organisational prerequisites for replacing Marxism-Leninism with a "Sinicised Marxism" were created as far back as in the early forties; the road was cleared for making the "thought of Mao" the dominant ideology in the CPC and for turning "Chairman Mao" into a living Buddha.

At the Tsunyi meeting in 1935 Mao Tse-tung had taken over control mainly of the army. By

the end of 1943, employing large-scale methods of terror, he and his supporters had succeeded in establishing undivided control over the Party as well, after having got rid of a considerable section of the revolutionary cadres and forced the others into submission.

Mao Tse-tung retained in the CPC leadership some persons who had opposed him actively or passively, after making them take an oath of implicit obedience. This move guaranteed him to a considerable degree against the rise of new opposition groups headed by men who enjoyed prestige in the Party and in the country; if they made critical statements, he could now accuse them of lack of principle, dishonesty, betrayal of their word, and so on.

The victory of Mao in the struggle to gain control over the Party was consolidated at the Seventh CPC Congress in 1945. Mao's personality cult was the keynote of this congress which approved "the thought of Mao", or "Sinicised Marxism", as the new ideological platform of the Communist Party of China. As a result, by the time the Kuomintang regime in China was overthrown, Mao Tse-tung had usurped power in the Party and in the army. After the revolution of 1949 he became the ruler of the whole country.

For more than 20 years, between the time of the Seventh CPC Congress and the so-called "cultural revolution", writes Wang Ming, Mao Tse-tung continuously carried out campaigns having various names. Their main content, their main objectives, methods and targets of attack

remained basically the same as in the first "campaign for ordering style". The first "campaign for ordering style" was a rehearsal for the so-called "cultural revolution", while the various other campaigns that followed it were, in one or another degree, direct preparatory measures for the "cultural revolution".

Indeed, what took place in Yenan in the forties is largely a key to understanding the processes that unfolded in the CPC leadership in the following decades. The same hand can be seen in all of them, Mao's hand. Mass hounding and persecution of all who dared to doubt Mao Tse-tung's guidelines and his power. The same method of setting social segments and groups against one another and also of inciting leaders to clash. The same inhuman attitude to yesterday's comrades-in-arms, including "the closest ones": Liu Shao-chi was "the closest" at the Seventh CPC Congress but during the "cultural revolution" he was subjected to total political disgrace; Lin Piao was "the closest" at the Ninth CPC Congress in 1969 but became Mao's victim in 1971. The choice of time by the Maoists for their attacks also follows a definite pattern: in the forties they took advantage of the fact that the Soviet Union and the world communist movement were engrossed in the battle against fascism; in the sixties, all the world's progressive forces were involved in the struggle against imperialist aggression in Vietnam and Indochina as a whole, in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. It is also indicative that at times like these Mao Tse-tung and his supporters openly flirted with the top impe-

rialist circles of the United States, simultaneously demonstrating their extreme nationalism and anti-Sovietism.

Maoist Nationalism and Anti-Sovietism Before the Victory of the Chinese Revolution

The stronger the position of Mao and his entourage in the CPC leadership became, the more definitely nationalism was manifested in their relations with the outer world. Mao's attitude towards the Comintern and the Soviet Union at any particular time was determined by the extent to which this attitude promoted his personal objectives.

An anti-Russian trend which developed into rabid anti-Sovietism became quite distinct in Mao Tse-tung's nationalism. Mao had been brought up in a spirit of great-Han chauvinism. He saw Russia as a huge bear, the way it had been symbolically represented on the map of the Ching empire which even before the "cultural revolution" was on display in the National Revolutionary Museum in Peking. In his own poetical revelations (for instance, in *Winter Clouds*, written on December 26, 1962) Mao employs the image of the "brown bear" which China's "brave warriors" do not fear.

Mao admitted his anti-Russian and Pan-Asian sentiments to Edgar Snow in Yenan in the thirties. He said that he remembered the charming words of a song (glorifying Japan's victory

in the war of 1904-1905.—*Authors*) in which one felt the beauty of Japan, and he admired the pride and strength glorified in that song dedicated to the victory over Russia.

A Soviet journalist who was in Yenan between 1940 and 1943 recalls that when he asked whose portrait—it was a portrait of Genghis Khan—hung in one of the offices of the Central Committee of the CPC side by side with a portrait of Mao, he received the reply: "This is a portrait of a Chinese emperor who ruled Russia too".

With the passage of time the nationalist notions grew into open anti-Sovietism. In his pamphlet *On the Events in China* Wang Ming justly notes:

"Mao Tse-tung has turned frenzied anti-Sovietism into his banner of struggle against Marxism-Leninism, against the Communist and Workers' parties, against socialism and communism, against the world revolution and peace in order to gain the approval and understanding of the imperialist clique headed by the USA and obtain the possibility of collaborating with it."

As Wang Ming correctly saw it, another reason behind the furious Maoist attacks against the CPSU and the Soviet Union was that in this way "Mao Tse-tung seeks to rupture the long-established, traditional friendship and fraternal relations between the Communist parties and the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. He is beset by a harrowing fear that the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will learn of the immense achievements which the Soviet people, led by the CPSU, have attained. . . ."

Wang Ming emphasised that Mao Tse-tung "is

exceedingly afraid that the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will learn that the material and cultural life of the Soviet people is steadily improving, that they are gradually moving from the principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work', to the principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs', in other words, that they are moving towards prosperous and happy life under communism."

Further, Wang Ming wrote: "Mao Tse-tung is extremely afraid that if the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people learn the truth on all these questions they will see more clearly the gross absurdity and perniciousness of the so-called 'thought of Mao Tse-tung' and of his policies. They will then inevitably and unanimously demand that China take the correct Marxist-Leninist road of socialist construction and of the struggle for universal peace, which has been followed by the Soviet Union. After appreciating all this they will rise with greater determination, on a larger scale, in a more organised manner and in greater unity against Mao Tse-tung and his 'thought', against the counter-revolutionary coup of Mao Tse-tung and his group. That is precisely why anti-Sovietism has become the focal point of Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy and the core of his policy at home."

Naturally, Mao Tse-tung did not advertise his great-power, anti-Soviet views until recent years. Russia, in the eyes of millions of Chinese, was the great homeland of the October Revolution, which had stirred the whole world. The Comintern and

the Soviet Union had given the Chinese Communists and the revolutionary cause in China great political, moral and material support. Since he could not possibly conceal this, Mao Tse-tung resorted to guile, making himself out to be a friend of the Soviet Union.

The facts disclose *Mao Tse-tung's real attitude towards the Comintern, the CPSU and the Soviet Union before 1949.*

An analysis of his attitude to the Comintern reveals that he wholly repeated the shopworn theory of the Chinese Trotskyites about "a poorly informed Comintern and about Chinese exclusiveness", that "loyalty and the discipline of the Comintern is one thing but loyalty to the Chinese revolution is something else".

Mao disguised his attitude. While creating a semblance of loyalty to the line of the Comintern he pursued a policy which ran counter to its guidelines. He snubbed cadres who had studied in Moscow and then returned to China.

The keynote of the anti-Comintern attacks by Mao Tse-tung and his group was the allegation that the Comintern did not know the real situation in China and therefore gave incorrect recommendations. But this was not true.

In the first place, while concealing Comintern instructions and guidelines from the Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung ascribed to himself the authorship of many of the strategic and tactical propositions they contained. Wang Ming relates: "Mao Tse-tung held that in order to write the history of the CPC as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone, it was necessary not to recognise the

services of Leninism, the Comintern, the CPSU and the Soviet Union in the history of the CPC and the Chinese revolution. It was necessary to deny that any leader, any Party functionary or member had rendered any service to the CPC and the Chinese revolution.

"According to Mao Tse-tung's statement, it was particularly necessary: 1) to deny the services rendered by Chu Chiu-po in the struggle against Right opportunist Chentuhsuism and also the services of the Extraordinary August Conference of the CPC (1927) which approved in its decisions this struggle and the services of the leadership of the Comintern which was the direct sponsor of this conference, and to proclaim the line of the August CPC Conference to be a 'Chuchuipoist Left opportunist line'; 2) to deny the services rendered by Wang Ming in the struggle against the Left adventurist line of Li Li-san and also the services of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, sixth convocation (January 1931), and the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (May 1931) which approved this struggle in their decisions, and to declare the line of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee a 'Left opportunist line of Wang Ming'; 3) to deny the services rendered by Wang Ming in putting forward the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front and the services of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern which approved this policy in its decisions; to declare this policy of the anti-Japanese national united front a 'Right-wing capitulatory line of Wang Ming'.

"According to Mao Tse-tung's statement, if the services of other persons in the history of the CPC and the Chinese revolution were recognised then 'there would be no Maoism', 'the history of the CPC as the history of Mao Tse-tung alone would be impossible' and there would be no 'especially high and unshakeable position of Mao Tse-tung in the CPC' ".

Mao shamelessly ascribed to himself the decisive role in the struggle against Chentuhsuism and Li Li-sanism, in drafting and implementing the united front policy and on many other questions.

In the second place, while accusing the Comintern of failing to know or understand the real situation in China, Mao Tse-tung did everything he could to conceal the real situation in the CPC and the Chinese Red Army; he deliberately disoriented the Comintern, although possibilities for systematically conveying information existed. Two-way communications between Moscow and Yenan were established in 1936. From 1936 onwards Soviet people were in Yenan as war correspondents and to help the Chinese Communists in organising the fight against Japanese aggression. However, after Mao Tse-tung and his closest supporters began to activate their nationalist efforts, they took an extremely suspicious and unfriendly attitude to the Soviet personnel.

In their reminiscences Soviet people relate that they were placed under secret surveillance by Kang-Sheng's department. "Living in the gully, in the caves, very close to Kang-Sheng," one of them says, "we felt isolated; our movements in the district, and especially trips to the region

where the leadership of the Special Area was situated, were restricted. Even Chiang Kai-shek's pressmen had much more freedom."

Notwithstanding special messages from Soviet governmental agencies and the Comintern directly to Mao Tse-tung requesting all due assistance to the Soviet personnel, the Maoists did everything they could to isolate them and to sow mistrust of them.

Mao and his entourage looked on the Soviet Union not so much as the world's first socialist state as on a source of material and political support. Already at that time the Maoists completely disregarded their internationalist duties.

In the initial, most difficult, period of the war against the nazis the Comintern and the Soviet Union put before the Chinese leadership the question of joint actions against the Japanese imperialists. On June 27, 1941, the leader of the Soviet group in Yenan reported that he had carried out the instructions to request the CPC leadership to give the Soviet Union assistance in the event of an attack by Japan. The Chinese leaders stated that they had already outlined a number of measures. At the end of the conversation Chu Teh asked that the following be conveyed to Moscow: if Japan attacked the Soviet Union, the Eighth People's Army would attack the Japanese with all the forces at its disposal and would be able to give the Soviet Union sufficient support. Mao Tse-tung confirmed this statement on July 3, 1941. No practical steps were taken, however. In July 1941 Yenan was informed that the Japanese were sending newly mobilised troops to the continent,

and the request was made to take effective action to prevent their concentration in the Peiping-Kalgan and Paotow sectors, that is, against the Soviet Union, and to disrupt traffic on the railways leading to the above-mentioned places. However, Mao Tse-tung ignored this request and also others.

As Soviet eyewitnesses of those events recall, on September 3, 1941, the question of possible CPC actions if Japan started a war against the Soviet Union was again put before Mao Tse-tung. In reply, he made tangled and evasive statements containing countless reservations and presenting the Soviet Union with a number of demands it clearly was unable to meet in that situation. When Mao Tse-tung was asked to state directly, without any "ifs", what the CPC could do in the event of a Japanese attack against the Soviet Union, he accused the Soviet representative of "a lack of dialectical thinking" and high-handedly broke off the conversation on this important question.

In the following period Mao and his supporters blocked all attempts to reach agreement on coordinated action.

The Comintern guidelines on the tactics of a united front between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang had an important role to play in the fight against the Japanese militarists and in successful development of the Chinese revolution. These guidelines were in accord with the general policy of the Comintern to develop mass movements within the framework of the international united front of the peoples in defence of China, in defence of the countries enslaved by

German fascism and in defence of the Soviet Union. They oriented people on immediately setting up a national united front, in their respective countries, of all the forces that opposed fascism.

The Comintern and the CPSU persistently urged Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the CPC to step up Chinese Red Army operations against the Japanese invaders and to strengthen the united front of the Chinese people. This would undoubtedly have contributed to the speediest defeat of Japanese imperialism. However, while continuing to give vows of loyalty to their internationalist duty, Mao and his supporters followed delaying tactics and evaded carrying out the recommendations and requests of the Comintern.

As mentioned above, there were deep-going differences of opinion in the CPC leadership concerning the united front. The group of internationalists was opposed by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, who denied the need to work together with the Kuomintang to organise the entire people to combat Japanese aggression. Only when experience had demonstrated that it was absolutely essential to build up a united front did Mao Tse-tung make an appearance of actively supporting this course. Today, Maoist chroniclers claim that "the tactics of the united front is one of Mao Tse-tung's greatest personal contributions to Marxism-Leninism".

From 1941 and 1942 onwards Mao's narrow nationalist course steadily curtailed the operations by CPC troops against Japan. Advocating these

tactics, he said: "...It is better if we save our strength; we will defeat the Kuomintang, gain power in China and then, with assistance from the Soviet Union, Great Britain and America, we will free China from the Japanese invaders...."

The passive attitude to the war against militarist Japan at a time when the interests of the international proletariat, the interests of the common struggle against fascism called for more active operations against the Japanese is yet another example of Mao's departure from internationalism. In an address to students of the Yenan Party School in November 1941 he declared that "in view of the changes in the international situation, which is not in favour of the CPC, our Party must now, besides expanding its real forces in every way, avoid sacrifices in order to preserve its forces". He proclaimed the following slogan: "Ten per cent of our efforts against Japan, 20 per cent against the Kuomintang and 70 per cent to build up our own forces."

In keeping with Mao's instructions, the Eighth and Fourth People's Revolutionary Armies did not conduct any active operations against the Japanese for a number of years. The Maoists propounded the following approach: Why irritate the Japanese and invite unpleasantness? It's better to have good-neighbourly relations with our adversary; we won't bother him and he won't interfere with us. "An order has been issued to all units," a Soviet war correspondent in Yenan wrote in January 1943, "not to wage hostilities against Japanese troops and to retreat during offensive operations by the latter. Wherever possible tem-

porary armistices should be concluded with them.... All districts and all CPC-controlled army units are trading with the Japanese rear; as a rule, the men in the staffs talk more about commercial operations than about waging hostilities."

It is obvious that in the forties Mao Tse-tung and his entourage gave as little thought to the internationalist obligations of the CPC in general, and its obligations towards the Soviet Union in particular, as they gave, in recent years, to China's fulfillment of its internationalist duty towards the peoples of the socialist countries, especially towards the heroic people of Vietnam.

During the Second World War Mao Tse-tung and his supporters underestimated the might of the Soviet Union and overestimated the strength of nazi Germany.

Instead of organising assistance to the world's first socialist country they circulated rumours about "the Soviet Union's inevitable defeat", that "24-year-old socialism cannot cope with eight-year-old nazism", that "Soviet military strategy is incorrect". Mao Tse-tung said that Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad should not have been defended but that these and other towns should have been surrendered without any major resistance, that the Red Army should have been evacuated eastwards, beyond the Ural Mountains, and partisan warfare waged against the Hitlerites while waiting for an Anglo-American offensive in the West.

The attitude of Mao and his supporters to the Soviet personnel in Yenan changed practically

overnight when the nazis attacked the Soviet Union.

"When Hitler Germany attacked the Soviet Union and our forces suffered setbacks," a member of the Soviet group there later recalled, "Mao smiled ambiguously, while his entourage, with the exception of Chu Teh, openly laughed and gloated, so much as to say: 'just look at how much your strength and your achievements are worth. The Red Army is clearly powerless to fight the Germans'."

"After the outbreak of the war and the temporary successes of the nazi troops the attitude became colder and more hostile than ever," a Soviet war correspondent wrote from Yenan. "Not only did people stop talking to us but they even stopped saying hello." "Employees of Kang-Sheng's department were openly sceptical about our prospects in the Patriotic War. There were cases of shameful hostile attacks. During a speech he made to officers of the 120th Division a Soviet representative was asked: 'Why isn't the Soviet Army fighting according to its Regulations? The Regulations say that blows must be struck against the enemy on his own territory!' This question called forth approving giggles on the part of the audience."

"Manifestations of nationalism," recall eyewitnesses of those hostile attacks, "were like mosquito bites and there was a great number of them, starting with the question: 'Well, we won't give away an inch of our land—but is the Northern Donets far from the Volga?' and ending with veiled insults from high-placed figures

who treated us with condescending politeness."

Slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda was methodically practised in Yenan. As mentioned above, in the course of the "campaign for ordering the style of work" the Maoists demanded that persons who had visited the Soviet Union or had studied there should "repent" and make slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union and the CPSU. They took advantage of every possible opportunity to sow among CPC members a lack of faith in the Comintern and Moscow. They dinned it into the heads of Communists that the Comintern had given instructions harmful to the Chinese revolutionary cause, that the Comintern had helped to indoctrinate Chinese students in the Soviet Union against the CPC, that these students had been turned into "foreign lackeys of the compradore type" who had been ordered to "usurp leadership of the CPC", and so on. "Repentants" made speeches of the same nature at the Seventh CPC Congress. Thus, a wary and often frankly hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union was implanted a long time ago.

Nationalist sentiments were fanned later as well, for example, among the Chinese employees in the liberated areas of Manchuria. Chinese Communists whose attitude to the Soviet Union was sincere and friendly and who strove to study Marxism-Leninism were insultingly called "the two-faced ones".

The international communist movement and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union consistently carried out a line of support and all-round assist-

ance to the CPC throughout the latter's history. Genuine internationalists could not have acted otherwise towards the Chinese people who had risen up to fight for emancipation, and towards the Chinese Communists who guided this struggle. Besides, even despite the major shortcomings in its leadership, the CPC was an important ally of the progressive forces in the battle against imperialism. As has already been said, the CPC as a whole was able to carry out its role of leader of the Chinese people's national liberation and revolutionary struggle.

Besides, despite the complexity of the situation in China and in the CPC there was hope that the shortcomings and difficulties in the Party would finally be surmounted with the help of the international communist movement. The line of the Comintern, the CPSU and the other fraternal parties contributed to the development of Marxist, internationalist trends in the CPC and served as an important counterbalance to the petty-bourgeois nationalist trend. The correctness of this line was confirmed by the victory of the 1949 Chinese revolution as a result of which the People's Republic of China was formed.

Maoist Attempts to Make a Deal with American Imperialism

The nationalist nature of the activity of Mao Tse-tung and his clique was manifested not only in their attitude to the international communist movement, the CPSU and the Soviet Union but

also in their *foreign policy course*, in their constant retreats from a principled class-conscious line, in their sharp, unjustified vacillations and extremist moves.

Although Yenan was kept regularly informed of the tactical and strategic tasks of the world communist movement at the time when the fascist menace was growing and there were increasing anti-Soviet manoeuvres by Western ruling circles, in the early forties Mao Tse-tung put forth guidelines of a doubtful nature. In 1940, for example, bypassing the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, he published an article in the newspaper *Hsinchunghua pao* opposing the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the United States. Also, he regarded as incorrect the Comintern line of a united front in China against militarist Japan. To all of this Mao opposed the idea of an alliance with Japan and its Chinese puppet Wang Ching-wei.

It is evidently in the light of this "thought of Mao" that one should examine his practical activity to disrupt the united front in China, to sabotage the co-ordination of operations with the Soviet Union in the struggle against Japanese aggression, to curtail military operations against the Japanese and to encourage covert co-operation with the Japanese authorities. However, Mao Tse-tung's trouble-making policy came up against firm resistance because it was too unpopular among the Chinese Communists and the people of China, and finally it was upset by the Soviet Army's victories in West and East.

Simultaneously, *for a long time Mao and his entourage harboured plans of making a deal with the American imperialists.* A whole series of questions naturally arises in the minds of the many who do not know the real history of the contacts between Maoists and America's ruling circles. For example, how could it have happened that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, who only a short time ago had furiously attacked the policy of peaceful coexistence between countries having different social systems, and who for many years had demonstratively emphasised their "irreconcilable" attitude to American imperialism, needed only two or three months (the time between the arrival of the first American sportsmen in the People's Republic of China, in April 1971, and the reaching of an agreement in July of the same year regarding a visit by the President of the United States to China) in order to "replace anger with kindness"? How is one to explain the fact that in connection with President Nixon's visit the men in Peking began to close their eyes to the aggressive actions by the US brass hats in Indochina?

Today, as before, the policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his associates has two aspects: one is the outer, superficial, propagandistic aspect, while the other is the secret, pragmatic aspect which conceals Mao's true intentions. This leads to the discrepancy between words and actions which has always been characteristic of the Maoists. This discrepancy is clearly revealed by an analysis of the relations between the Maoists and the American imperialists.

Mao and his supporters began to flirt with America's ruling circles as long ago as the thirties, displaying a readiness to make a deal with them.

Meanwhile the Americans attentively followed the situation in China and brazenly meddled in its domestic affairs. At a comparatively early stage they realised the substance of Mao's policy and his true political nature. Former US Secretary of State Cordell Hull said in his *Memoirs* that Chinese communism differed from Russian communism. In a talk with a Japanese admiral, President Franklin D. Roosevelt emphasised that Chinese communism was not the same as Russian communism and that Japan did not have to fear Communism in China. American Congressman Walter Judd said in 1942 that Edgar Hoover, John Morgan and Winston Churchill could be considered Communists as much as the Chinese peasants could. Already in those years the American representatives in China (Patrick Hurley and others) were working to win over Chinese Communists to the side of the United States or, at least, to force them to pursue a policy independent of the Soviet Union.

The Maoists and the Americans took various mutual practical steps to "build bridges". US policy-makers actively strove for contacts with Mao Tse-tung and his associates because the Maoist subversive activity was in line with American imperialist interests.

At the beginning of 1942 American military observers arrived in Yenan, where the Central Committee of the CPC was then located. They announced that the United States planned

to land troops on the territory of Japan and China in 1946 and that after this they would be able to give military-technical and other material support to the forces operating under CPC guidance. In connection with this, Mao Tse-tung summoned commanders and political instructors of military units, secretaries of district and higher Party committees and responsible workers from various mass organisations to the Central Party School in Yenan. These people, who had been taken away from active struggle and political work, remained in Yenan until the Soviet Army entered Manchuria. "All of them looked forward to an American offensive in 1946 and to American assistance," Chinese Communists related. "CPC leaders base their military plans in the main on co-ordination with landing operations by Americans on the Chinese coast," a Soviet journalist in the Liberated Area wrote in November 1944.

In the summer of 1944 an American delegation led by the US military attaché to Kuomintang China visited Yenan. On June 29, 1944, Mao Tse-tung called a small meeting to discuss questions connected with this visit. The main line was expressed as follows: the CPC is prepared to co-operate with America and Britain now, during the offensive, and after the war; all the economic and military resources of the Special Area will be utilised for this purpose.

Why did Mao Tse-tung and his supporters take this stand? The answer can be found in a volume of official American documents dealing with relations between the United States and

China from 1944 to 1949. For one thing, it is openly admitted in the volume that between 1943 and 1945 a group of US State Department officials was in constant contact with the Chinese leaders. At that time John Stewart Service, a member of the group, reported to Washington that in the opinion of the Yenan leaders the Soviet Union was incapable of giving China the necessary assistance on a large scale, which only the United States could furnish. Service quoted Chinese leaders as saying:

"America's friendship and support are more important to China than Russia's friendship and support."

Washington frankly named "the price" which the Maoists would have to pay for rapprochement with the United States. In 1942 the chief of the group of American military observers in Yenan had conveyed to Mao Tse-tung the American President's proposal to give him assistance *on the condition that he rupture his ties with the Soviet Union and the Comintern.* In conversations with the Chinese leaders in October and November 1944 US representatives reminded them that "the opinion of American diplomatic circles" was that if the Special Area were totally independent, if it were not under Moscow's influence and used by Moscow, then the Americans could rest assured about the outcome of their policy of rapprochement with the CPC.

Although Mao Tse-tung's official reply to the Americans is not known, his subsequent actions testify quite definitely to his agreement to make a deal with the US imperialists by accepting their

terms. Among these actions, for one thing, is his campaign to combat "foreign stereotypes" and to establish "Sinicised Marxism", which, in substance, was a demonstration of the CPC leadership's break with the Comintern on the ideological plane. In turn, the liquidation, during the "movement for ordering style", of Party cadres who upheld the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was a demonstrative break with the Comintern on the organisational plane.

In 1944 the idea of renaming the Communist Party gained circulation in Yenan. Mao Tse-tung's line of reasoning on this score was: "If we renamed the Party, it would create a more favourable situation for the Special Area, particularly as far as the Americans are concerned...." The CPC leadership gradually paved the way for raising the question of opening a US Consulate in Yenan. Negotiations on joint intelligence work in the Japanese-occupied areas were held with the Americans.

In the autumn of 1944 Patrick Y. Hurley, personal representative of the American President, arrived in Yenan. Together with the Yenan leaders he drew up the draft of a treaty between the CPC and Chiang Kai-shek. When the work was finished he presented Mao Tse-tung with a letter of gratitude "for brilliant co-operation and leadership" and recommended that Mao send a personal message to the President of the United States. Hurley's advice was taken. In his letter Mao Tse-tung praised the "brilliant abilities" of Hurley and his "sympathies towards the Chinese

people". He emphasised: "On behalf of our Party, our Army and the whole of the Chinese people I express our gratitude to you *for your assistance and concern about democracy, the anti-Japanese war and the unity of all China.* The American and Chinese peoples maintain a traditional, historical, close friendship. I express profound hopes that, with your desire and assistance, after the Japanese have been defeated, the Americans and the Chinese—two great nations—will always go forward hand in hand along the road of building a new peace throughout the world.

"I wish you health. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Central Committee, CPC. November 10, 1944."

In July 1971 an article by the prominent American diplomat and publicist John Kenneth Emmerson, containing reminiscences of his stay in Yenan in the forties, appeared in a Japanese magazine. Emmerson wrote that in 1944 Mao had endeavoured to win the favour of the Americans. Mao's immediate hope was to receive military aid which he needed to strengthen his armed forces and his government both to fight the Japanese army (although, like Chiang Kai-shek, he believed that the ones who would defeat Japan were the Americans) and also to capture power in China, through civil war, if necessary. In 1944 the communist leaders probably considered that co-operation with the United States would be possible even after they overthrew the Nationalist Government. Further, Emmerson noted that in the new period of "ping-pong diplomacy" it was instructive to recall what the Chinese had said to

the Americans in Yenan in 1944. The following words of Chairman Mao are not included in his little red book of quotations but they are genuine nevertheless. In the course of a long conversation with a diplomat in Yenan on August 23, 1944, Mao said:

"We cannot risk a clash with the United States.... After all, we Chinese regard you Americans as the ideal of democracy.... We do not expect Russian assistance.... Chinese and American interests are similar and supplementary. They fit in with one another economically and politically. We can and must co-operate.... The Americans do not have to be afraid that we will not be prepared to co-operate. We must co-operate and we need American aid. That is why it is so important for us Communists to know what you Americans think and intend to do. We cannot risk arousing your displeasure, we cannot risk any clash with you."

Emmerson cites an official collection of documents on relations between the United States and China. He adds that similar thoughts were expressed in December 1944 by Kang-Sheng, who until very recently was one of the most influential Chinese Communists. Kang-Sheng said that he admired American frankness and emphasised that China would greatly need American technical specialists in the post-war period.

Mao and his followers did everything they could to win the favour of the US ruling circles, including attempts to threaten the latter with China widening its contacts with the Soviet Union. The Maoists frankly declared in July

1944 in Yenan that America and Britain would have to effect a rapprochement with, and gradually recognise, the Special Area as being the only realistic force in China after the inevitable bankruptcy of Chiang Kai-shek. To support this thesis an idea was expressed that the United States and Britain would have to "take this road because of deadly fear of the Soviet Union" and therefore their aim would be to neutralise the Soviet Union's influence both in the Special Area and in the rest of China. Mao Tse-tung strove to take advantage of this situation to consolidate his positions.

As Allen Whiting, a former US State Department employee, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28, 1971, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai informed President Roosevelt through secret channels in January 1945 that they, as leaders of a Chinese political party, were prepared to go to Washington for preliminary talks with him. According to Whiting, Mao wanted the United States to give China substantial economic and military support in the war against Japan, and in establishing a coalition government of the Nationalists and Communists. Besides this, he intended to ascertain whether Washington was prepared to co-operate with Communist China if the coalition collapsed and the Communists gained the upper hand in a civil war.

Whiting said that in March 1945 Mao Tse-tung formulated his plan for the development of Sino-American relations as follows:

China's biggest post-war need will be economic development. China does not have the solid basis

needed to cope with this by itself. Its living standard is so low that it cannot be lowered further to obtain the necessary capital.

America and China supplement each other economically. They will not compete. China does not have the wherewithal to build up large-scale industry. It cannot hope to reach the level of the United States in highly-specialised production. America needs a market for the output of its heavy industries and specialised products. Furthermore, it needs opportunities for capital investment.

China needs to develop its light industry.... In time it could supply products of the light industry to other countries of the Far East. It has raw materials and farm produce to pay for foreign trade and to cover the outlays connected with capital investments.

Not only is America the most suitable country to help China in this economic development but it is also the only country really capable of participating in this endeavour. In view of all these reasons there should not, and cannot, be any conflict, any alienation or any misunderstandings between the Chinese people and America....

Neither the peasants nor the Chinese people as a whole are ready for socialism and will not be ready for it for a long time. We will have to go through a long period of democratically regulated private initiative. To talk of the immediate building of socialism is counter-revolution because it is practically impossible, and attempts to implement it would be disastrous.

In short, Whiting summed up, Mao Tse-tung

suggested that the United States should, by granting technical assistance and capital, develop China on the condition that under communist rule there would not be either confrontation or expropriation "for a long time to come", as he put it. It was not only economic considerations that operated in favour of the orientation towards Washington. Mao stressed that America was "the only suitable" and "the only" country to help China, and he excluded any role whatever to be played by Russia.

Continuing his testimony, Whiting said that in April 1945 Chou En-lai's personal secretary had told an American official that although all Communists had a single world outlook, and the same doctrines and goals, their policies and programmes differed. He pointed out in a most undisguised manner that the Chinese Communists wanted Outer Mongolia to be part of China.

The frankest attempt "to probe" American intentions, according to Whiting, was made in 1946 when Chou En-lai told George Marshall, the American Ambassador at large: "Of course, we will incline towards one side, but the extent will depend on you."

For several reasons, however, nothing came of the Maoist attempts to make a deal with the United States in the forties. The main reason was that the Soviet Union's victory in the war against nazi Germany, and, especially, the defeat of Japan, the liberation of Manchuria by the Soviet Army and also the all-round disinterested assistance which the Soviet people gave to the

Chinese people in their fight against the Kuomintang earned the Soviet Union and the ideas of proletarian internationalism and socialism tremendous prestige in China. Mao Tse-tung and his henchmen were unable to counter this prestige and to continue their course of making a deal with American imperialism. They were compelled to change their tactics urgently, to make a show of sharing the principles of proletarian internationalism and to masquerade as friends of the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China became part of the socialist community and became an ally of the Soviet Union.

Despite all the changes in the situation, Mao Tse-tung did not relinquish hopes of driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the United States and of simultaneously arranging co-operation with the Americans.

The Soviet representative in Yenan reported in February 1947 that notwithstanding its fulminations against US actions in China, the CPC leadership was carrying out "a far-sighted policy" aimed at ensuring durable contacts with the United States.

It is in the context of the same policy that one should examine the statement by Mao at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC, Seventh Convocation (beginning of 1949) that "after the victory of our revolution China will not establish diplomatic relations either with the Soviet Union or with Britain and America for the first two years at least". By doing this the Maoists wished to achieve several objectives: to carry out the US demand to break off

relations with Moscow; to undermine the prestige of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Chinese people and progressive world opinion by putting the Soviet Union, a socialist country, on the same footing as the imperialists; to make the People's Republic of China a neutral country not connected with the socialist community.

While liberating China from the Kuomintang forces Mao Tse-tung and his followers strove to avoid affecting the interests of the United States in any way. For example, for a long time they did not undertake any actions against the American forces stationed in Tsingtao.

Soviet specialists who were in China between 1948 and 1950 related: "Although Britain and the United States actively supported and continue to support Chiang Kai-shek, part of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC was infected with the illusion of early recognition of the People's Republic of China by these two countries."

While making these political and diplomatic bows to the United States, Mao and his henchmen also hurried to get into the good graces of business circles of that imperialist country. After Tientsin was liberated they invited a representative of American commercial circles there and the Chinese authorities entered into negotiations with him at once. When the People's Government assumed power in Shanghai the American companies which controlled the power plants sharply raised the electricity rates for Chinese factories while keeping the rates for foreign manufacturing and commercial companies at the previous

level. Although this step by American entrepreneurs was clearly discriminatory the Shanghai authorities made no attempt to retaliate.

Recalling their work in China in that period, Soviet specialists noted that some of the members of the Bureau of the CPC Central Committee for the Northeast (Manchuria) opposed any encroachment on the interests of foreign capital in that area.

Discussing the principles of the new China's economic development, the Chinese leaders openly declared: "We will not object to the participation of American and British capital in industrial development." They spoke in favour of giving Western capitalists the possibility of setting up concessions in the People's Republic of China; they reproached all members of the CPC leadership who "expected too much from the Soviet Union".

Chou En-lai's negative attitude towards the sending of Soviet specialists to the Chinese cities in which American economic interests were concentrated should also be viewed in the context of the pro-American sentiments.

Mao Tse-tung continued to calculate on cooperation with the US ruling circles in the following period as well. He did not give up the idea of rapprochement with the United States even after the outbreak of American aggression against the Korean People's Democratic Republic. In 1956 he reasoned thus: We must work to tear Britain away from the United States, to support Britain's striving to be independent of America, and then, with its help, *get closer to the United*

States, which is not altogether hopeless either. In January 1965, when the American journalist Edgar Snow asked him whether he wanted to convey a message to President Johnson, Mao said that of course he regretted that the forces of history had separated the American and Chinese peoples and that, if the occasion arose, the forces of history should reunite the two peoples. Such a day would certainly come, he said.

Calculations of this kind evidently explain the circumstance that *Mao Tse-tung kept a fairly large group of Americans close to himself over a long period of years.*

The journalist Edgar Snow arrived in Yenan way back in 1936, and Mao had frank talks with him that lasted many days. At approximately the same time a certain Ma Hai-te (his real name was George Hatem) lived there under the guise of a doctor. It was the consensus in foreign circles that Ma Hai-te was an American intelligence agent. While working in the American mission and simultaneously maintaining contacts with the CPC leadership, he was a kind of double informer and liaison officer between them. Each of the sides (the American and the Chinese) valued Ma Hai-te since either was interested in obtaining information. Incidentally, Ma Hai-te won particular favour with Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's wife.

As was mentioned above, a group of US military men arrived in Yenan at the beginning of 1942. There were Americans at the headquarters of the Chinese Communists throughout nearly the whole of the Chinese people's war against the

Japanese. They were allowed to set up a permament US military mission in Yenan; groups of American officers equipped with radio transmitters and receivers established themselves at most of the CPC bases; Americans travelled freely about the Liberated Area.

American observers under General Stilwell were there constantly from 1944 to March 1946; various American officials arrived periodically. The journalists Anna Louise Strong and Agnes Smedley, and Professor Elliosser, a friend of the American Ambassador to China, and others came to Yenan at different periods for a long stay. After the evacuation of Yenan a Chinese-speaking American journalist stayed together with the Chinese leaders and worked in the editorial office of the Party's central newspaper. Some of the Americans (Rittenberg, Ma Hai-te, Elliosser and others) were suspected of being *directly connected with imperialist intelligence.* Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders were warned about this but they ignored the warnings.

By the end of 1940, when it became more and more obvious that the Kuomintang forces would be defeated, the United States made considerable efforts to leave as large a number of Americans as possible on Chinese territory. Shortly before the Kuomintang's complete military collapse American army men in China began to turn into businessmen, writers, employees of UNRRA, and so on. The American intelligence service made active use of all possible philanthropical organisations in China which maintained contacts with

the United States and willingly gave employment to Americans. This helped them to keep many Americans in China after 1949.

The US agents who settled in China expanded their contacts with representatives of the new authorities and in quite a few cases obtained the support of prominent government officials. When the further sojourn of any of them in the People's Republic of China became risky for some reason, they were allowed to leave the country without hindrance, notwithstanding the fact that Chinese agencies possessed information about their belonging to US intelligence.

As for the Americans who remained in the People's Republic of China, the relations of the Chinese leaders with many of them became still more trusting and assumed the nature of personal friendship. Anna Louise Strong, Ma Hai-te, S. Rittenberg, I. Epstein, D. Tannenbaum, J. Schumann and others enjoyed special benefits and privileges. Many of them held influential posts. For instance, Rittenberg became the censor of Peking Radio's foreign broadcasts, Epstein, the editor of the magazines *China Reconstructs* and *Peking Review*, published in many foreign languages; M. Shapiro was an executive of the Foreign Languages Publishing House and also had much influence in the governmental news agency Hsinhua and in the newspaper *Jenmin Jihpao*, organ of the Central Committee of the CPC. David Crook, Solomon Adler and Frank Coe headed departments in the ministries of industry, agriculture and domestic and foreign trade, and surrounded themselves with people whom

they trusted completely. Also, Rittenberg and Coe acted as experts in working with delegations from abroad. These are only a few examples of the penetration of Americans into leading bodies in the People's Republic of China.

Nearly all the above-mentioned persons attended the reception given by Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching on Anna Louise Strong's 80th birthday in 1965. In the summer of that year the former Provisional President of the Kuomintang government, Li Tsung-jen, returned to Peking after having spent sixteen years in the United States. Mao arranged a pompous welcome for this rabid reactionary, a man who headed Kuomintang punitive forces which had fought the Communists, a man who ranked second, after Chiang Kai-shek, in the list of war criminals who were enemies of the Chinese people.

Many Americans who resided permanently in the People's Republic of China had an opportunity to obtain important information at first hand. For many years Anna Louise Strong was in contact with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and other CPC leaders. The Chinese wife of Ma Hai-te is a personal friend of Chiang Ching. US intelligence agents in Hong Kong maintained contacts with Americans in China and obtained information from them. According to foreign sources, representatives of the US General Consulate in Hong Kong have long had contacts with employees of the Hsinhua Agency in Hong Kong.

Naturally, all these contacts were by no means "platonic" or accidental.

The "cultural revolution" introduced some new nuances into this situation. At first, many of the "Peking Americans" took an active part in the "cultural revolution". Anna Louise Strong stood at Mao's side at parades of Hungweipings. Rittenberg became a Hungweiping leader, while F. Coe tried to found "international Hungweiping detachments" among the immigrants residing in the People's Republic of China. Epstein's wife was a member of the Hungweiping headquarters staff headed by Chiang Ching, and so on. Many of them often spoke at rallies and meetings in support of the "cultural revolution", glorified Mao Tse-tung and made anti-Soviet speeches.

Next, it was reported from Peking that several of these persons had been arrested by rampant Hungweipings who had got out of control. It is difficult to say how much truth there is in those rumours. At any rate, a Hsinhua report of July 14, 1971, describing a meeting between Chou En-lai and "American friends", mentioned George Hatem (Ma Hai-te), Julian Schumann and Frank Coe.

Chinese-American talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971 gave official weight to an invitation to the American President which had been made by Mao Tse-tung in December 1970 through Edgar Snow. President Nixon visited the People's Republic of China in February 1972.

"The Chinese Americans" undoubtedly played no small role in that event. It will suffice to remind the reader of the 1970 visit to China by Edgar Snow, who had frequent meetings with Mao Tse-tung during the several months he spent

there. Soon after Snow left for China in August 1970 American sportsmen and journalists were invited to come to the People's Republic of China. Among the latter was John Roderick, who had worked in China from 1945 to 1948 and to whom Chou En-lai, in the spring of 1971, addressed the words: "Mr. Roderick, you opened the doors."

An interesting sidelight is that Chinese who had been in the United States were always present at the most important talks in Peking directly connected with President Nixon's visit. Thus, during Mao Tse-tung's meetings with Snow in December 1970 notes were taken by Nancy Tang, American-born daughter of Tang Ming-chao, editor of a Chinese-language newspaper in New York, who had returned to the People's Republic of China, was put in charge of cultural relations with other countries and was then appointed a member of the Chinese Embassy to the United Nations. An employee of Chou En-lai's Secretariat, Chou, a former Harvard University student, interpreted during Chou En-lai's interview with James Reston in August 1971, etc.

The experience of history shows that when statesmen pursue a policy having concealed, underhand motives, this does not promote peace; besides, they rarely attain their objectives. Mao Tse-tung swore that he was a friend of the Soviet Union and an irreconcilable opponent of the American imperialists. But he attempted to slander the Soviet Union's consistent policy of peaceful coexistence, calling it a "deal" with the United States. However, he himself has for decades been secretly flirting with the American imperialists,

doing everything he can to win their favour, and sacrificing, for the sake of Sino-American rapprochement, the contacts of the CPC and People's Republic of China with the international revolutionary movement and the Soviet Union, and also sacrificing the interests of the embattled Vietnamese and other peoples. It is hopeless in our time, however, to count on deceiving the peoples, for they closely follow world developments. In the long run the deal made by the Maoists with American imperialism became an obvious fact, demonstrating once again the hypocrisy and lack of principle of Mao Tse-tung and his closest henchmen.

The Maoist Policy on Cadres

Among the circumstances that shed light on the underlying causes of the present situation in China no little significance attaches to the fact that *the CPC leadership is heavily loaded with nationalistic, petty-bourgeois, Trotskyite and other alien elements.* This is illustrated by documents and it is unanimously noted by Soviet people who directly observed developments in China for a long time and whose practical work was connected with that country.

Even the CPC leadership itself has had to admit that the Party ranks are clogged. The Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in April 1945 adopted a "Decision on Some Questions of the History of Our Party" which pointed out: "Not only is our Party surrounded by this broad segment of society (the

petty bourgeoisie) but people of petty-bourgeois origin constitute the tremendous majority inside it.... Furthermore, in China's economic conditions even the working masses and Party members from among the workers easily become covered with a petty-bourgeois mould. Therefore, petty-bourgeois ideology of all shades is often reflected in the Party." The same document spoke of the presence in the CPC of "liberals, reformists, anarchists, Blanquists and so on who have decked themselves out in a Marxist-Leninist toga", and it noted the danger that "petty-bourgeois elements will undoubtedly attempt to change the appearance of the Party—the advanced detachment of the proletariat—to fit their own image and likeness, and to gain control of it, which would damage the cause of the Party and the people".

Mao Tse-tung was compelled to make similar admissions on more than one occasion. In 1955 he noted: "After it was founded, the Communist Party of China was forced to carry out the bulk of its work in the rural areas. It was in the rural areas that the People's Liberation Army was formed, and its cadres were built up chiefly of peasants as well as of men from the old officer corps". In 1956 he emphasised: "The CPC is a large Party and it had been considerably clogged; conceit and bureaucracy perhaps manifest themselves more actively than in other parties, for in China there are more semi-feudal conditions than anywhere else and they have given birth to sectarian and local trends more than anywhere else."

The Communist Party of China arose as a party

of the Marxist-Leninist type. However, as was mentioned above, in the early years the main CPC cadres consisted of people of petty-bourgeois origin, members of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Part of the members had come into the CPC through groups of Chinese Communists that had been formed in Paris, Berlin, Tokyo and other places abroad. Naturally, these people were remote from the life and struggle of the Chinese proletariat. It is indicative that some of the participants in the First Congress of the CPC later turned into renegades and out-and-out anti-Communists. Tai Chi-tao, for example, headed the Right wing of the Kuomintang, Chen Kung-po became a puppet of the Japanese military, and so on. In the years from 1924 to 1927 CPC organisations began to grow among the industrial workers. The violent reign of counter-revolutionary terror that followed, the smashing of Party organisations in the cities and the shift of the entire work of the CPC to the army and the liberated areas, which were cut off from the proletarian centres, contributed still further to clogging the CPC with non-proletarian elements.

The Yenan period played a special part in this process. The war against the Japanese invaders turned Yenan into a centre which attracted patriotically-minded people from all over China, and later many of them became genuine revolutionaries. But many Kuomintang and Japanese agents, agents of imperialist intelligence services and also Trotskyites and other anti-Party elements likewise came to Yenan.

Nor did the way of life which Mao Tse-tung

and his supporters implanted in Yenan contribute to building up Marxist-Leninist cadres. What is more, it had a degrading influence on unstable people. The inactive decade of "sitting in Yenan" had a particularly disastrous influence on the young people. Describing the situation in February 1942, a Soviet correspondent related that the best section of young people had left the Special Area in 1939 and 1940, and that the worst ones had remained there. He wrote the following about this group of the cadres who were under Mao Tse-tung's wing:

"These people are totally incapable of performing any active work; all they can do is make speeches which are devoid of content and go on for hours, or else gossip about their comrades for days on end. Their education had given them no practical knowledge at all, and, at best, a hazy idea of political matters, on which they had memorised a collection of phrases and quotations." They either knew nothing at all about the history of China and of the revolutionary movement or else had very foggy notions about them. Their knowledge of the Soviet Union was equally superficial. Notwithstanding their limited knowledge of political and economic subjects, continued the Soviet correspondent, such people passed judgement on any topic. Their ambition was to hold top posts, and they scorned all kinds of work at grass-roots level or technical work. They were carried away by revolutionary talk and rejected and censured all Chinese culture and customs. The innate Chinese politeness was completely foreign to them. They were illiterate as

regards military affairs. Although when filling in forms they wrote that they had served in the armed forces and had taken part in military engagements, actually their military service had amounted to a short period of work among the population residing near an army unit. All had eagerly sought to be transferred to Yenan to attend a course of studies. As for participation in battles against the Japanese, they had never even seen a Japanese soldier and had fled as soon as Japanese units approached to within 25 or 30 kilometres. Although they loudly professed their readiness to make sacrifices, the Soviet correspondent stated further, they could sit for months waiting for the departure of five or ten Japanese soldiers billeted in a village.

An analogous assessment of the Maoists was given by others as well. "The cadres in the Special Area are weak. Most of them do not have any experience of life and do not know any trade. Many of them are filled with a philistine spirit of lofty predestination as leaders of the revolution in future. Actually, they display cowardice, self-interest, and unwillingness to accept an unobtrusive post." Later such persons were often promoted to leading posts, for Mao Tse-tung considered a sojourn in Yenan to be the highest attestation for any functionary. It was these men who became Mao Tse-tung's most loyal supporters.

The clogging of the CPC and its leadership became more intensive during the civil war of 1946 to 1949, when Kuomintang divisions, corps and whole armies went over to the side of the

People's Liberation Army together with their generals and their staffs. A considerable number of the people who became CPC members in this period were non-proletarian elements, bearers of petty-bourgeois and nationalist views, and Kuomintangers.

In a message to the Central Committee of the CPC in 1936 the Comintern emphasised: "We are particularly disturbed by the decision that all applicants can become Party members irrespective of their social origin, that the Party does not fear the penetration of some careerists into its ranks, and also your stated intention to accept even Chang Hsueh-liang (a militarist and rabid reactionary.—*Authors*) into the Party.... We would also consider it a mistake to admit students and former officers of other armies into the ranks of the Red Army indiscriminately.... We consider it incorrect to allow representatives of propertied classes to take part in political administration in the areas where the people are in power...."

However, far from showing necessary concern about purity of the ranks of the CPC as a Marxist-Leninist Party, Mao Tse-tung did just the opposite. The mass of people who joined the CPC in the Yenan period and after it only went through a course of Maoist "re-education" and "repentance", after which they became a pool from which the cadres of the political bodies, editorial offices, publishing houses, the officer corps of the Red Army, and so on, were replenished. The "movement for ordering style" in the early forties was aimed exclusively against those who upheld Marxism-Leninism, the Comintern, and did not

share the views of Mao Tse-tung, but it was, in essence, a campaign of complete forgiveness of elements that were indeed opposed to the Party. On the eve of the Seventh Congress of the CPC, in 1945, Mao Tse-tung staged another amnesty of these people, declaring that "the roots" of Left-deviationist and Right-opportunist mistakes had been "liquidated" and that "it was necessary to welcome and draw into work for the benefit of the Party, without any prejudice, all comrades who had made mistakes in the past, if they realised their mistakes and had begun to remedy them". Moreover, the amnesty affected, as a rule, people with anti-Soviet views who had obediently accepted the "thought of Mao".

This course was by no means accidental. Mao himself and his supporters had displayed *Right-wing capitulatory tendencies* on many occasions before. As long ago as December 1930 one of the provincial committees of the CPC passed a decision stating: "Mao Tse-tung is an out-and-out Right-wing opportunist from start to finish."

Soviet specialists who worked in China described the Maoist Right-opportunist doings, a major aspect of which was a disdainful, even inimical, attitude to the working class. After the victory of the Chinese revolution the CPC leadership did not take any radical steps to create the political and material requisites for the working class to feel that it was the class in power. Industrial workers continued to eke out a semi-starvation existence. A 12-hour working day was established. Wages remained the same as in the period of Kuomintang domination. No laws about workers' labour pro-

tection or social insurance were issued. The "Rules Regulating Relations Between Labour and Capital", approved in November 1949, not only failed to develop the main principles recorded in the General Programme of the Political Consultative Meeting but, in substance, signified their rejection.

The top circles in the CPC continued *to underestimate the role of the working class in the revolutionary transformation of the country.* Workers were not even enrolled in the Communist University because the leadership regarded them as being "insufficiently mature, illiterate and politically backward" and claimed that "they had not taken an active part in the revolution".

Although the CPC had for many years relied on the peasantry, which had been the mass base of the People's Liberation Army and its source of supply, the Chinese leaders were irresolute and frightened about carrying out revolutionary measures in the rural areas either.

On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his clique took a patently benevolent attitude towards the bourgeoisie. The absence of any restrictive measures, even with regard to the big national bourgeoisie, contributed to an activation of their reactionary efforts; no trade turnover tax was imposed; a resolute struggle against profiteers was not carried out. Soviet specialists stated in 1949: "A policy of flirting with foreign capitalist enterprises and commercial firms is being carried out. No tax pressure or any other restrictive measures are being applied...." The view is being circulated in the CPC that "after the complete vic-

tory on the battlefronts the class struggle will subside inasmuch as the new government is drawing all sections of the country's population, including the national bourgeoisie, into co-operation".

A section of the Communists, including members of the leading circles of the CPC, adopted a "theory" claiming that "the new kulaks" emerging after the land reform were a "revolutionary force" that supported the Communist Party and the People's Government.

In conversations with representatives of fraternal parties in 1949 Chinese leaders declared: "There is no danger at all in the fact that a new type of kulak is appearing in the villages because this kulak has received his wealth from the new regime and firmly supports it.... This new kulak is revolutionary-minded." In his report at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in June 1950 Mao Tse-tung officially set the following task: "...We must change our policy towards the kulaks, that is, we must switch over from a policy of requisitioning surpluses of grain and property from the kulaks to a policy of preserving kulak farms...."

Describing the situation in the CPC itself, Soviet employees note as long ago as 1949 that "*growth of the Party through an influx from the working class is insignificant.* Practically no active efforts are being made to draw industrial workers into the ranks of the Party. Party organisations are clogged to a considerable degree with landlord-kulak and bourgeois elements and in a number of districts people are being admitted to

Party membership wholesale".

Observations by leading members of fraternal parties who visited China in those years confirmed the above impressions of Soviet people: "The new democratic authorities are granting too much freedom to the national bourgeoisie in the towns. The private capitalist element in the towns has an exceptionally favourable soil for growth. To this day the workers at private factories lack all rights and are completely subordinated to the entrepreneurs.

"No attention is being paid to the working class of China. The new authorities believe that the Chinese working class lacks political awareness, does not yet understand the Party's policy, and therefore cannot be drawn into active construction. In consequence of that view no efforts are being made at all to draw industrial workers into the Party or to educate them ideologically."

It was noted with alarm that Mao "is not giving his people, above all the working class, clear and definite prospects. Therefore, the concentration of all power in his hands arouses some fears". The Peking leaders declared: "We cannot allow any class struggle at privately-owned factories in the new China, and we must give the entrepreneur freedom of action in order to increase production. The Chinese working class is illiterate, lacks political awareness and for this reason it cannot, as yet, be drawn into the class struggle." In reply to a remark that Lenin had emphasised the need to teach the working class and boldly promote it, the Maoists said that these

instructions of Lenin's were known in Peking but that "they did not, as yet, apply to the specific conditions in China, and that this was a matter for the future".

The Chinese leaders did not concern themselves with strengthening the leading role of the working class or with increasing its level of organisation because they were pinning their main hopes on the peasantry, on the kulaks. Their statements in a conversation with P. F. Yudin in 1951 are of interest in this connection. They said that there were opinions among CPC members in favour of "regarding the kulak as the main figure in the countryside" and that from this they drew the conclusion that only "by developing the kulak farms can China expand its rural productive forces and build up a source of grain and raw materials for the towns and industry". Therefore, it was necessary to support, in the rural areas, those Communists whose farms were growing into kulak farms; they should not be expelled from the Party but helped to develop their farms; such Communists should be an example to all peasants.

As they attentively followed all these alarming signs, representatives of the CPSU and of other Marxist-Leninist parties repeatedly expressed their concern. Thus, shortly before the victory of the Chinese revolution, many key questions were discussed with Mao and other Chinese leaders. In substance, these included the entire range of major problems which the CPC would have to solve in the concluding stage of the Chinese revolution and after its victory. The CPSU continued

to give assistance of this kind after the formation of the People's Republic of China as well, making concrete recommendations and offering advice on all the problems that arose. All this was invariably welcomed by the Chinese side in words but Mao Tse-tung and his supporters continued to pursue their own line on many questions.

The Right-opportunist trend arose in the CPC because the Party leadership had not ensured purity of its ranks, or the dominant position of the working class or of proletarian ideology in the Party. The Maoists regulated the composition of the Party membership in such a way as to create ideological confusion in it, and to squeeze members of the working class out of the CPC leadership in order to ensure freedom of action for themselves.

The Chinese working class was not, in effect, represented in the Central Committee of the CPC. Even on the eve of the "cultural revolution", in the 17th year of the People's Republic of China, there were very few persons of working-class origin in the Central Committee of the CPC (today, as before, data concerning the social composition of the leading bodies of the CPC are painstakingly concealed by the Peking leaders). The only member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee who comes from a working-class family is Chen Yun, but since the late fifties he has been kept away from active participation in Party and public affairs. Addressing college graduates in August 1961, Chen Yi, former Politbureau member, admitted: "Among the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the CPC

there are very many people who come from families in the middle and upper strata and very few who come from truly working-class and peasant families. . . ."

Mao Tse-tung gradually surrounded himself with people who faithfully served him personally or, at any rate, did not try to compete with him. This group was formed, in the main, in the Yenan period, although Mao had established relations with some of its members earlier.

It will suffice to name Kang-Sheng, one of the most ominous figures in the leading core of the CPC, Mao's active supporter and "right hand". The dark pages in Kang-Sheng's biography are connected not only with the criminal role which he played in beating up and murdering CPC cadres. Years ago Soviet personnel reported from Yenan: "Some Party members believe, not without reason, that Kang-Sheng is an enemy of the Soviet Union and of the CPC. There is reason to believe that he is a Kuomintang, and even a Japanese, spy."

The composition of the petty-bourgeois nationalist section of the CPC leadership, headed by Mao Tse-tung, and its actions led Soviet people who were in China to draw the following conclusion: "...We see," one of them wrote in February 1942, "a group hostile to the Soviet Union, a group which is very strong and controls everything."

It should be added that Soviet Communists who worked in China for a long time noted with alarm that there were possibilities and channels for imperialist intelligence services to

send their agents into the CPC, including its top leading group.

One of the Soviet Communists related, for instance: "As can be seen from numerous facts, in its time the Kuomintang secret service put down deep roots in the CPC and had its agents in all links of the Party, from the lowest to the highest. Now this network of agents (the dossier of the agents of the Kuomintang secret service was shipped out to Taiwan) is undoubtedly being used by US intelligence agencies in case of need. The same applies, to a certain degree, to the network of Japanese agents set up in various segments of Chinese society during the occupation. . . ."

Naturally, this matter requires thorough study. However, even the available data enables one to declare that the CPC leadership is clogged with unworthy elements. This is particularly dangerous in the situation when Mao Tse-tung and his clique are steering an anti-Soviet, nationalist course.

Conclusion

Our review of some pages from Mao Tse-tung's political biography shows that the furious political and ideological battle which he and his group are waging against the international communist movement, against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties, against the Marxist-Leninist teaching and the gains of socialism in China, did not arise all at once; nor did it arise spontaneously. This course has its own

sources and history, and it is connected to a considerable degree with such a subjective factor as Mao Tse-tung's political activity.

The "great helmsman" was never a real Marxist. He only masqueraded as a Marxist, his sole objective being to usurp all power in the CPC and in China. Mao worked towards this objective ever since the early stages of his political activity. His battle for unlimited power attained its culmination in recent years, especially in the period of the so-called "cultural revolution" and in the "September crisis" that followed it, as well as in the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" campaign which began early in 1974.

Mao and his supporters were never internationalists. On the contrary, they have always been rabid nationalists and extreme great-power chauvinists. These men understood long ago that the main obstacles to the realisation of their hegemonic schemes are the Marxist-Leninist parties, which take an internationalist stand, and in the first place the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Party with the most historical experience of fighting for the interests of the working people, the Party which has given the world a model of how to put the ideals of socialism and proletarian internationalism into practice. For this reason an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist trend has held the dominant place in Maoist nationalism. The true physiognomy of the Maoists was completely exposed by the acts of armed provocation which the Chinese authorities staged on the Soviet border in the spring and summer of 1969, by their unceasing policy of hating the CPSU and the

other Marxist-Leninist parties, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Bourgeois revisionist historiography, not to speak of Mao's court chroniclers, attempts to give him the aureole of "a romantic revolutionary" who played the decisive role in the victory of the Chinese revolution and in the destiny of the many millions of the Chinese people, a man worthy of being "leader of the world". There is no doubt, however, and some day the Chinese Marxists and the Chinese people will be able to tell all the facts, to make known their opinion on this score and to draw up an objective assessment of the "contribution" by Mao, who has brought so many trials and so much suffering to the working people of China.

The Chinese revolution took place under complicated and difficult conditions, and its development and victory were invariably promoted by the Marxist, internationalist forces both within the CPC and in the international arena. The Chinese people have suffered enormous losses, including losses resulting from Mao Tse-tung's actions to gain unlimited power. But thanks to the efforts of millions of Communists and constant, intensive support from the Soviet Union and the world working class, the revolution was victorious in China. Attempts to ascribe all the successes of the Chinese revolution to Mao Tse-tung alone are doomed to failure.

The facts of history show that in the eyes of the international communist movement the Maoists are not simply theoretical meddlers or erring political leaders but men who have nothing in com-

mon with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, men who deliberately distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching and thirst for world hegemony.

If that is the case, the reader might ask why then did the international communist movement maintain contacts with the CPC leadership and give it extensive assistance?

For one thing, it was not to Mao Tse-tung and his followers that the CPSU, the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the international communist movement gave their support but to *the Chinese people* which had risen up to make a revolution and were battling selflessly for national and social emancipation, to *the Communist Party of China,* which headed this struggle, and to *the People's Republic of China*, which had become a member of the socialist community and had taken the road of socialism. *The anti-Marxist, anti-peoples activity of Mao Tse-tung and his followers cannot overshadow the glorious history of the heroic struggle waged by the Communists and working people of China for socialism.* There is still less reason to believe that the last word has been said in this struggle.

For another thing, a battle between two trends —the genuine Marxist, internationalist trend and the petty-bourgeois nationalist trend camouflaged by "Left" phrases—has long been taking place in the Communist Party of China. Naturally, the world communist movement and the CPSU have always been disturbed by the anti-Party tendencies in the activity of Mao Tse-tung and his clique. Nevertheless, it was reasonable to assume that the

development of the revolutionary process in China and the constant theoretical and practical support given to the CPC by the international communist movement and the CPSU would consolidate the healthy forces in the Communist Party of China and that in the long run it would march forward together with the rest of the world communist movement.

The Soviet Union's consistent and all-round assistance to the Chinese revolution and its paramount role in the emancipation of China from the imperialist yoke tremendously increased the prestige of socialism in China. This prestige was enhanced still further when the CPC leadership, lacking the necessary experience of work in conditions of peace and also experience in economic management and governing the country as a whole, had to rely on the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries. Economic rehabilitation and further economic and cultural advancement called for extensive economic, technical and other assistance from abroad. In view of the imperialist blockade the People's Republic of China was able to get such assistance only from the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. This circumstance compelled the advocates of the petty-bourgeois nationalistic trend in Peking to lie low and temporarily to suppress or to camouflage their anti-socialist aspirations. After the victory of the revolution in China the course of building socialism and of strengthening internationalist ties with the socialist countries and with the Marxist-Leninist parties triumphed. This confirmed *the correctness of the line taken by the CPSU and*

the international communist movement in relation to the CPC and China.

The formation of the People's Republic of China and the establishment of people's democratic rule in the country, with the guiding role of the Communist Party, the all-round sincere assistance given by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries and the change in the alignment of class forces in the world in favour of socialism, all this opened up broad and reliable socialist horizons before the Chinese people. In the initial period of the existence of People's China the Communist Party determined the ways and means of translating this socialist prospect into reality. In 1953 the CPC announced its general line in the period of transition and set its sights on mobilising all its forces to turn China into a strong socialist country.

The Eighth CPC Congress in 1956 drafted and consolidated a course of building a socialist society in China. The Congress proclaimed that "in its activity the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly explains the laws governing the development of society and correctly indicates the roads of building socialism and communism". This did away with the thesis of "Sinicised Marxism" and with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the ideological platform put forward at the Seventh Congress in 1945.

It appeared as though the cause of socialism had acquired a solid foundation in China. However, the battle inside the CPC continued. Whereas the Marxist, internationalist wing of

the Party upheld the course of building a socialist society in China in close alliance with the fraternal countries, the petty-bourgeois, nationalist elements pursued a different objective, that of harnessing the economic and political achievements of the People's Republic of China to their great-power, hegemonic designs.

It was from this standpoint that they viewed the economic and cultural strides of People's China and the growth of its international prestige. Marxism-Leninism was replaced more and more widely by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in propaganda and in political educational work. Violations of the Leninist standards of Party life, and repressive actions against Communists who upheld Marxist-Leninist, internationalist views gradually acquired a systematic nature. The cult of Mao Tse-tung's personality took on increasingly ugly forms.

The petty-bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership continued to deal underhand blows at the section of the leadership and Party members who adhered to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Thus, in 1954 and 1955 there arose the case of the "bloc of Kao-Kang and Jao Shu-shih"; in 1957 a new "movement for ordering the style of work" was launched; in 1958 and 1959 a battle was begun against "Right-wing opportunist elements" headed by Peng Teh-huai, Chang Wen-tien and others; in 1960 a campaign against so-called revisionists was proclaimed.

In the mid-fifties the People's Republic of China entered what Lenin called "the vital core of the development of the revolution". Deep-going

changes were effected in the non-socialist sectors of the economy. The strides made in the period of the first five-year plan laid a foundation for further progress, for the organisation of large-scale socialist production under strict state supervision and with firm discipline. The prospect of completely doing away with small-scale private ownership became distinctly clear. This, naturally, aroused resistance on the part of small property owners. It led to an increase in vacillation which, in turn, exercised an influence on the petty-bourgeois, nationalist elements in the CPC leadership. "We began to put forward our line of development . . . in April 1956. . .," Mao Tse-tung admitted at a conference in the Central Committee of the CPC in 1958. "The principles of this line were similar to the Soviet principles but were filled with our own content."

Describing the wavering of the petty bourgeoisie, Lenin wrote: "This wavering flows in two 'streams': petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e., servility to the bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of sentimental democratic and 'Social'-Democratic phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois revolutionism—menacing, blustering and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in deeds."[1]

At first Mao Tse-tung and his supporters followed in the footsteps of petty-bourgeois reformism. At a time when the CPC was still taking a general orientation towards scientific socialism they put forward "new political guidelines" which

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 21.

actually were an expression of Right-wing opportunism. The "course of prolonged coexistence between the Communist Party and the bourgeois-democratic parties, and of *reciprocal control between them*", which the Maoists proclaimed in April 1956 and carried out, undermined the leading role of the CPC in society and gave the bourgeois parties in the People's Republic of China an effective lever to fight for power. As applied in practice by the Maoists, the slogan "let all flowers blossom" legalised anti-Marxist, anti-socialist views and their propaganda, and undermined the dominant position of the proletarian ideology in the country. The theory of "contradictions among the people", which classified the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as being non-antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people and facilitated actions by the enemies of socialism.

Taking advantage of those "new guidelines" the national bourgeoisie mounted an open attack against socialism in the spring of 1957. It attempted to discredit the social and political system in the People's Republic of China, the system of economic management, all public organisations. The national bourgeoisie demanded repeal of the fundamental changes that had been made in capitalist industry and trade, the handicrafts industry and agriculture. It issued calls to wipe out the Communists, to smash the CPC and its leadership. Frightened—above all, for their own safety—the petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders in the CPC hurried to revise their "new guidelines" substantially. The working class and the Com-

munists repulsed the offensive of the bourgeoisie. However, the shift towards the Right in the policy of the CPC leadership and the wide circulation of opportunist "courses" and "slogans" gave the petty-bourgeois ideology greater influence than ever.

The success of the first five-year plan, the considerable increase of the country's economic and military potential and the growth of the international prestige of the Communist Party of China and of the People's Republic of China were assessed by the Maoist leaders in a singular way. Now they veered sharply in the direction of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. This was expressed in the "three red banners" policy announced in 1958. Instead of the former general line of the CPC, which had been a clear-cut programme of socialist construction, the Maoists proclaimed a new "general line" with the hazy slogan: "By straining all forces, let us go forward and build socialism according to the principle 'more, faster, better, more economically'." The "great leap forward" and the implantation of people's communes everywhere were proclaimed the foundation of the economic policy. In foreign affairs the Maoists set their sights on exacerbating tension, on attaining world hegemony and on worsening their relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The Communist Party of China proved incapable of opposing these "innovations". A considerable section of the Party membership fell prey to waverings. The fact that the Marxist-Leninist internationalist cadres had, by this time, been

paralysed and removed from the leadership is not the only explanation. As a result of the specific conditions in which the Party was developing, and also as a result of the cadres policy which the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of the Party had carried out for many years, there was a substantial predominance of small property-owning elements in the CPC. According to official Chinese figures, in 1956 industrial workers constituted only 14 per cent of the Party membership, while peasants comprised 69 per cent.

One should bear in mind the fears which Lenin expressed in 1922 about a tendency to "regard as workers people who have not had the slightest real experience of large-scale industry. There has been case after case of petty bourgeois, who have become workers by chance and only for a very short time, being classed as workers".[1] This makes possible a situation in which the proletarian nature of a party does not guarantee it against a possible tipping of the scales, moreover, in a very short time, by petty-economy elements.

Another extremely important instruction given by Lenin which should be taken into account is that where there is a big influx of former small property owners into the Party "the proletarian policy of the Party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party."[2]

---

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 254.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

By systematically destroying the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres the petty-bourgeois nationalists in the CPC dealt a blow above all at the Party's Old Guard.

It goes without saying that the difficulties which the Communist Party of China came up against were by no means unsurmountable. Experience shows that it is possible to cope with the petty-bourgeois danger if one follows the Marxist-Leninist teaching always and in all things, if one constantly strengthens the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, headed by the working class, and guides oneself by the fundamental interests of the working people. However, the Maoists pinned their hopes on petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the fundamental interests of the working class, peasantry and working intelligentsia.

It is particularly important to stress that the positions of the working class in the People's Republic of China were seriously weakened in that period. The erosion, during the "great leap forward", of large-scale industry, which Lenin called the "vital foundation" of the proletariat, and the cut-back in industrialisation unsettled the working class and undermined its capacity to withstand the petty-bourgeois waverings. On the other hand, despite the formation of co-operatives, the anarchic influence of the small proprietor on the situation in the country and his vacillations did not diminish. Speaking of the main features of the petty-bourgeois element, Lenin said: "It will take collectives, collective farms and com-

munes years to change this".[1] Under the impact of all these factors the petty-bourgeois nationalist trend gained the upper hand in the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

"At the end of the fifties," declared the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "the CPC leadership adopted a new line in foreign and domestic policy, which was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism and flagrantly contradicted the principles of proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. The Mao Tse-tung group took up a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power chauvinism disguised by 'Left' phraseology; it openly set out on a course intended to undermine the unity of the socialist community and to split the world communist movement.

"The adventurist line of the Mao Tse-tung group seriously weakened the positions of the Communist Party and the Chinese working class and gave a free hand to petty-bourgeois and anarchist elements. It seriously threatens the socialist achievements of the Chinese people."

It is absolutely obvious that *even in the complicated conditions of the People's Republic of China such a course was not fatally inevitable.* After the successful first five-year plan in 1957 the country stood on the threshold of new achievements in economic and cultural development, in the broadening of democracy and in the sphere of foreign policy. The promise of these achieve-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 276.

ments would undoubtedly have become a reality if the CPC leadership had carried out a genuine Marxist-Leninist policy, if it had preserved and developed the Party's leading role, if it had done its utmost to promote a growth in the ranks of the working class and its political awareness and a heightening of its influence on the life of society, if it had worked consistently to overcome survivals of the small-proprietor and nationalist way of thinking. But China's misfortune was that bearers of petty-bourgeois nationalist views and strivings ruled the Party and the country. Their actions created conditions for new blows by the small-property elements at the working class, blows which developed into an open frontal offensive. This offensive began when Mao Tse-tung gave the signal, on August 5, 1966, to "open fire at the headquarters" (this means the Party organisations) and took the form of the ill-famed "cultural revolution".

The battle inside the Communist Party of China did not end after the "cultural revolution", however.

The establishment of a new political organisation of the Maoists under the banner of the CPC came up against serious obstacles. Peking propaganda was compelled to return again and again to "the improvement and construction of Party organisations", "a purge of the Party" and other questions. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the CPC the establishment of provincial Party committees was speeded up, although no district or other lower Party organisations had yet been set up in many places. The delegates to the con-

ferences (or "congresses" as the Chinese press calls them) which set up provincial Party committees were appointed, as a matter of fact, by the heads of the respective "revolutionary committees". These same leaders became the heads of the new Party committees. With rare exceptions they were army men.

The difficulties which the petty-bourgeois nationalists experience can be seen from the fact that they have been forced to restore the former organisational structure, the very same structure which was destroyed, on their insistance, during the "cultural revolution". Although they are a formality, the Central Committee of the Party and its Politbureau do exist. Formed by methods which have little in common with the Marxist-Leninist Party standards they consist mainly of army men, and the Politbureau includes persons closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (including his wife, personal secretary, former bodyguard, etc.). However, if the conditions in the Party and in the country improve, this structure can in itself play a positive role. Furthermore, the present CPC leadership has been compelled to reinstate some of the former Party cadres who were hounded and discredited during the "cultural revolution".

Another indication of the Maoists' difficulties is that notwithstanding the long years of propaganda and mass-scale "brainwashing", the "re-education" of CPC members and functionaries in the "May seventh schools"—in effect, concentration camps—and Mao's personality cult, the inculcation of his "thought" into the minds of Chinese Communists and the advanced part of the Chi-

nese people is clearly meeting with resistance. In the light of the present situation in the People's Republic of China, this circumstance can explain the fact that the Peking press has begun to talk about the need to study the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is no doubt that the main object of this "study" is to utilise the slogan of "spreading Marxism—Leninism—Mao's thought" to consolidate the influence of the petty-bourgeois ideology and the "thought of Mao". This, however, is an indicative fact in itself.

The instability of the Maoist regime was illustrated by the crisis that broke out in the Peking leadership in the autumn of 1971 and the political campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", accompanied by spontaneous actions of the working people, popular disturbances, and a struggle between rival groups that developed into armed clashes.

The opposition which the Maoists come up against in putting their plans into practice shows that *the healthy forces in the CPC offer unceasing resistance.* China's genuine Communists, of whom there are evidently quite a few, are in a difficult position now. But the decisions of the Eighth CPC Congress, which the Ninth and Tenth congresses were unable to counter with anything viable, give them a constructive programme for China's development along the socialist road.

Complicated though the present situation is, rebirth of the CPC as a Party of the Marxist-Leninist type, restoration of its unity with the world communist movement, the return of the People's Republic of China to the road of scientif-

ic socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union, and cohesion with the socialist community are an objective need for Chinese society. All the more since elements of a socialist basis continue to exist in China. Although these socialist elements which still exist in the economy and in the social structure are being distorted by the military-bureaucratic authorities and are being deformed by the anti-socialist policy, the economic foundation of society has not, as yet, undergone radical changes and it can serve as the material basis for China's development in a positive direction.

Addressing the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said: "We do not identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China's genuine national renascence, and its social development, will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and fraternal co-operation with them."[1]

* * *

The Maoists' furious attacks against the world communist movement and the socialist community, against the fraternal parties and countries, the

[1] *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow 1969*, Prague 1969, p. 160.

open, irreconcilable enmity towards the CPSU and the Soviet Union, prompt Marxists to re-examine the history of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution, and the role which Mao and his clique played in it, to make a more attentive, unbiassed analysis of the testimony and documents of the past decades. Such an analysis is necessary. It provides an opportunity to get to the roots of the matter, to make a correct assessment of the nature and prospects of the political development of a country to whose destinies the international communist movement and the peoples of the socialist countries cannot be indifferent.

The 50-year history of the Communist Party of China contains much that is instructive not only to parties in countries with a level of development close to China's but to the communist movement as a whole. The main conclusion to be drawn from it is that it is essential to constantly strengthen the militancy of Communist parties. "The force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force," Lenin emphasised. "Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully."[1]

The events in China are a lesson to all the Communists of the world. They serve as a reminder of the dangers of petty-bourgeois ideology

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 44-45.

and nationalism. Today, when the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of human society, it is necessary to pay particular attention to Lenin's instruction that the struggle "against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole)".[1]

Maoism is an ideological and political trend fundamentally hostile to Marxism-Leninism. It replaces materialist dialectics by sophism and eclecticism, and the materialist understanding of history by voluntarism. A parasitic growth on the fundamental propositions of socialist ideology, it denies, in effect, the leading role of the working class in the socialist transformation of society and the role of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class, and energetically belittles the part played by the popular masses in history. Under cover of anti-imperialist phraseology, the Maoists oppose themselves to the international communist movement and wage subversive activity against the Marxist-Leninist parties in an attempt to impose their own nationalist programme on them.

---

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

For this reason it is necessary to combat Maoism first and foremost because it is a form of *social-chauvinism* having aims that are incompatible with those of the world communist and liberation movement, with the principled propositions of Marxism-Leninism on fundamental aspects of building socialism, world development and revolutionary strategy and tactics. Maoism's apologia of violence and the omnipotence of the bayonet, its great-power chauvinism and bid to dominate the world, its so-called "revolution in the sphere of the superstructure", signifying replacement of the people's democratic social system by a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, and its militarisation of society, all have nothing in common with scientific socialism.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, constantly confirming its unswerving course of friendship and internationalist solidarity with the Communist Party of China and with the People's Republic of China, considers, at the same time, that it is necessary to resolutely expose the anti-Leninist views and great-power, nationalist course pursued by the present Chinese leaders, to step up efforts in defence of Marxism-Leninism and the general line of the international communist movement.

The sharp escalation of the war of ideas in the present period makes it particularly necessary to expose Maoism. The whole of the vast machinery of anti-communist propaganda is now aimed at weakening the unity of the socialist countries and of the international communist movement, dividing the progressive forces and undermining so-

cialist society from within. In this situation Mao Tse-tung and his associates are abettors of anti-communism. "Peking's practical activity on the international scene convinces us increasingly that China's foreign policy has, in effect, departed from proletarian internationalism and shed all socialist class content," Leonid Brezhnev declared at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969.[1]

A Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in June 1969 unanimously endorsed the stand of the CPSU delegation at the International Meeting. It emphasised that "the CPSU will wage an irreconcilable struggle against the anti-Leninist ideological guidelines of the present rulers of China, against their divisive policy and great-power foreign policy course". The Plenary Meeting also noted that "the CPSU believes that the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide".

The 24th Congress of the CPSU, which met in late March and early April of 1971, fully endorsed the principled Leninist course and concrete steps of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Congress declared: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split of the international communist

[1] *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow 1969*, Prague 1969, p. 158.

and the whole anti-imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand—a stand of consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist Motherland."[1]

While firmly rejecting the slanderous inventions by Chinese propaganda about the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, the 24th Party Congress reaffirmed the unchanging course of the CPSU towards normalising Soviet-Chinese relations, towards restoring good-neighbourly relations and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

A Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in November 1971 noted that the Politbureau was consistently carrying out the line of the 24th Party Congress towards the People's Republic of China and expressed full agreement with the Politbureau's stand in settling practical questions connected with this line.

As before, the Soviet people have great respect and sincere friendly feelings for the fraternal Chinese people. They do not in any degree identify the Communist Party of China or the People's Republic of China with the Mao Tse-tung group. Nor do they identify the vicious slanderous attacks by the Maoists against the Soviet Union and the CPSU, against the international communist movement, with the true attitude of the Communists and working people of China towards our Party and country, towards all the fraternal

[1] *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 212.

parties and the socialist community. In his report on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union on December 21, 1972, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said: "*We want to see China a flourishing socialist power, and to work shoulder to shoulder with her for peace, against imperialism. But when this will come about depends on China herself.*"[1] (Our emphasis.—*Authors*).

Soviet people believe that the tragedy which China is now living through is a transient stage in its history and that, despite all the difficulties, the cause of socialism will triumph in China too. By the whole of their history the Chinese people have shown that they can rightly be called a great, heroic people. There is no doubt that when the Chinese people have surmounted the difficulties they will succeed in upholding the gains of their revolution and will return China to the road of genuine socialist development. In the long run, good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China will be restored because this accords not only with the fundamental, long-range interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples but also with the interests of the world socialist system, with the interests of the revolutionary liberation movement of all the oppressed peoples and with the interests of universal peace.

---

[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, p. 47.

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.

Please send all your comments to 21, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.

IN RECENT YEARS THE MAOISTS HAVE BEEN WAGING A VIOLENT STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES. THEIR DIVISIVE POLICY UNDERMINES THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

THIS BOOK BY O. VLADIMIROV AND V. RYAZANTSEV, INTENDED FOR THE GENERAL READER, EXPLAINS WHY MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS SUPPORTERS HAVE LAUNCHED THEIR VIRULENT ATTACKS AGAINST THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO SPLIT THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

Imported by
IMPORTED PUBLICATIONS, INC.
320 West Ohio Street
Chicago, Illinois 60610
Phone 312/787-9017